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THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT AND REPARATIONS:
CREATING A JUDICIAL OR STATUTORY
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
The freedom of which we boast is not lost in shattered Dunkirks
and blazing Pearl Harbours, . . . such events call forth the ut-
most resistance. Freedom is lost little by little in noiseless theft, a
fragment of concession to expediency here, a morsel of 'what
does it matter?' there. Then, shockingly, we find that freedom
has disappeared in the regimentation of not only our daily doings
but our eternal ambitions. I
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt ordered the evacuation, relocation and internment of 120,000
people of Japanese ancestry from the west coast.2 We remember the
tragedy at Pearl Harbor every December 7th, and a memorial honors
those killed. Yet our country has not satisfactorily addressed the now
recognized unconstitutional internment of those of Japanese ancestry
during World War II.3 Approximately two-thirds of those interned were
native-born American citizens.4
The government's violation of the internees' constitutional rights
easily could have been forgotten.5 However, discoveries made by Peter
1. A. BOSWORTH, AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 244 (1967) (quoting The Royal
Bank of Canada Monthly Letter (January, 1966)).
2. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943). See infra note 82 for a discussion
of the specific areas the Exclusion Order covered. Any further reference to the "internment"
includes the evacuation, relocation and internment of those of Japanese ancestry during World
War II.
3. See infra note 23 for a list of alleged constitutional violations arising from the intern-
ment. See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government's
effort to compensate the internees for property losses due to the internment. Compare H.R.
442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1) (1987) with S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a)(6) (1987)
(the Senate bill recognizes that basic civilliberties and constitutional rights were violated by
the evacuation and internment whereas the House bill only acknowledges "the fundamental
injustice" of the evacuation, relocation and internment).
4. 133 CONG. REc. H7561 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Fish).
5. The government originally asserted that its actions were necessary due to the war and
were constitutional under its War Powers. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943).
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Irons, an attorney and legal historian, reopened the internment issue.6
During his research, Professor Irons found documents that disclosed the
government's fraudulent concealment of its reason for ordering the in-
ternment. About the same time, Congress appointed the Commission
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) to "inves-
tigate and review the problems resulting from [the] internment program,
and then make recommendations to the Congress and the President as to
what solutions should be made."8 The CWRIC issued its findings in
1982 which, among other things, suggested the government was guilty of
concealing its reasons for the internment from the Supreme Court.9 This
information would have been crucial to the Court when it decided the
first curfew/exclusion order violation case. 10
Due to Professor Iron's discoveries and the CWRIC's findings, re-
cent judicial decisions and pending legislation have reopened the intern-
ment issue.1" The Supreme Court's decisions in fHirabayashi v. United
States,12 Yasui v. United States,'3 and Korematsu v. United States,14 up-
6. Peter Irons' original intent was to focus his research on the legal strategies and tactics
involved in the original four constitutional test cases to the internment. P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT
WAR vii (1982). These four test cases were: Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 273 (1944); Korematsu,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); and Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) [hereinafter the original internment cases]. Through his Freedom of Information Act
request, Peter Irons obtained documents from Justice Department files in which:
the government's own lawyers charged their superiors with the "suppression of evi-
dence" and with presenting to the Supreme Court a key military report that con-
tained "lies" and "intentional falsehoods." [His] research also uncovered military
files that disclose the alteration and destruction by War Department officials of cru-
cial evidence in these cases. Rather than expose to the Court the contradictions be-
tween this evidence and claims made by Justice Department lawyers, military
officials literally consigned the offending documents to a bonfire.
P. IRONS, supra, vii-ix.
Peter Irons was not only instrumental in uncovering this information, but was also one of
the attorneys that represented Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi and Minoru Yasui in
their petitions for writ of error coram nobis. See notes 148-68 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these petitions and their significance.
7. See P. IRONS, supra note 6, for an in-depth analysis of the government's concealment
of its reason for ordering the internment. See also infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
8. Hearings on H.R. 5499 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1980) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5499].
9. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 252 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc deniedper curiam,
793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instruc-
tions to transfer case to the Federal Circuit).
10. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1456 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).
11. See infra notes 290-323 and accompanying text for a discussion of pending legislation.
12. 320 U.S. 81.
13. 320 U.S. 115.
14. 323 U.S. 214.
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holding the criminal convictions of Japanese American citizens for viola-
tions of curfew and exclusion orders during World War II, have been
challenged and overturned.15 Legislation has also been proposed to
make reparations to those interned during World War 11.16
One of the most recent challenges to the internment was brought in
the federal class action suit of Hohri v. United States.17 In Hohri, plain-
tiffs sued to recover damages from the United States for the wartime
internment of Japanese citizens and residents of Japanese ancestry."8
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs
could pursue their taking clause claim against the federal government,
that the Tucker Act19 waived the government's sovereign immunity
under the takings clause and that the statute of limitations on this claim
was tolled until 1980.20 The Hohri decision raises a number of issues.
One principal issue is whether the statute of limitations on the takings
claim was tolled since, according to the court of appeals, nothing but an
authoritative statement from one of the political branches could have re-
butted the presumption given to the military's judgment that the intern-
ment was necessary.21
An even more important issue, however, is one that the Hohri court
failed to address in-depth, namely that plaintiffs' non-takings constitu-
tional claims are barred by sovereign immunity.22 The resulting problem
is that the United States can deprive citizens of their constitutional rights
and yet be immune from suit for its actions. This Comment will first
address the need to create a cause of action against the federal govern-
ment for constitutional violations23 of the internees' rights.24 A discus-
15. Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985); Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. 1445;
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 290-323.
17. 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated and re-
manded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer case to the Federal Circuit). For
an in-depth discussion of the Hohri case, see infra text accompanying notes 169-209.
18. 782 F.2d at 231.
19. The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for claims founded on statutes, regula-
tions, contracts or the Constitution which create substantive rights to money damages. Id. at
2.42 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983)).
Reliance on the Tucker Act for takings claims is no longer necessary. The Supreme Court
recently decided First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987). In First English, the Court held that the takings clause is a constitutional provision
that is self-executing, and therefore, statutory recognition was not necessary to bring an action
for just compensation under the fifth amendment. Id. at 2386.
20. 782 F.2d at 253, 256.
21. Id. at 252. See infra notes 177-188 and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 244.
23. For example, a cause of action could be implied against the government for its viola-
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sion of past and present reparations legislation intended to redress the
internment will follow. 25 This Comment will then discuss the problems
with pending legislation and will propose revisions.26 Finally, this Com-
ment proposes that Congress enact legislation to prevent future viola-
tions, under circumstances similar to the internment, where it is later
found that national security did not justify the government's violation of
constitutional rights.2 7 This legislation would allow the federal govern-
ment to invoke only qualified immunity for constitutional violations.
28
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Prejudices that Fostered the Exclusion
To help understand why a racially discriminatory action such as the
internment occurred, a historical review of the west coast's treatment of
the Japanese is necessary. The actions taken against those of Japanese
ancestry during World War II were not simply the result of fear of espio-
nage and sabotage, but were primarily the result of greed and prejudice.
West coast anti-Japanese sentiment began as early as 1890.29 The
first Japanese immigrants came to the United States as cheap agricultural
and railroad labor.3" They replaced the Chinese who were excluded from
immigration by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.31 The Japanese, un-
fortunately, inherited the existing hatred directed against the Chinese.
32
In fact, at first, the white majority did not distinguish these two ethnic
groups from one another.33 Like their Chinese predecessors, the Japanese
tion of the fifth amendment's due process, equal protection and privileges and immunities
clauses; the fourth amendment's search and seizure clause; the eighth amendment's cruel and
unusual punishment clause; the sixth amendment's rights to fair trial and counsel; the first
amendment's press, speech, religion, petition and assembly clauses; article I, section 9's prohi-
bition of bills of attainder, ex post facto laws and the right to the writ of habeas corpus; and the
thirteenth amendment's protection from involuntary servitude. These were the constitutional
violations plaintiffs alleged in Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d at 244, for which the United
States had not statutorily waived its sovereign immunity.
24. See infra notes 214-82 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 283-99 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 300-23 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 324-47 and accompanying text.
28. Reference to "internment-type cases" includes instances where, similar to the intern-
ment, it is later found that the government's violation of constitutional rights was not justified
under the guise of national security.
29. J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 22 (1970) [hereinafter TENBROEK].
30. REPORT OF THE COMMIsSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CI-
VILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 30 (1982) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED].
31. Id.
32. TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 23.
33. Id.
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were viewed as immoral, "'tricky, unreliable and dishonest.' , In the
early 1900's, Hollywood fueled these Japanese stereotypes by depicting
Orientals as sinister and evil.
Besides the stereotypes that existed, the public feared that Japan
would invade the United States. Japan's victories over Russia in 1904
and 1905 increased this fear.36 The west coast Japanese were considered
spies, even prior to World War 11.31 Thus, as Japanese immigration rap-
idly increased, racists claimed that the Japanese would inundate and
dominate the west coast. 38 Newspapers added to racial hysteria by fea-
turing headlines such as "Japanese a Menace to American Women" and
"The Yellow Peril-How Japanese Crowd Out the White Race."'39 Pol-
ticians fed upon this racial hysteria and successfully used anti-Japanese
campaigns to win elections.4'
Jealousy and greed only worsened prejudices against the Japanese.
The majority of Japanese immigrants were farmers.42 Upon initially
coming to America, they worked as cheap farm laborers. Being both
ambitious and hardworking, they soon leased land and successfully
farmed for themselves.4 3 Small non-Japanese farmers came to fear the
competition, and large non-Japanese farmers resented losing their pri-
mary labor force. 4 As a result, the agricultural community became a
major force in anti-Japanese sentiment and legislation.45
Additionally, Japanese immigrants entered the job market and
worked as laborers for "railroads, lumber companies, canneries or
mines."46 They were often willing to work harder and for less money
34. Id. at 24 (footnote and citation omitted).
35. Id. at 29-32.
36. Id. at 25-26.
37. Id. at 26. An example of the rhetoric claiming that the Japanese were spies is seen in
the following excerpt:
"A characteristic among Japanese... is their propensity for spying.... Put a huge
roof over the Japanese Empire, and you have a national Japanese detective agency,
with which there is nothing to compare in the rest of the world.... Their spying has
been done long ago about this country, and more particularly so, California, and the
results are shown now. Japan intends to make California its Manchurian fields."
Id. (quoting Yellow Peril, ORGANIZED LABOR, Mar. 11, 1905).
38. Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 58-59.
39. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 33.
40. Hearings on HR. 5449, supra note 8, at 59.
41. Id.
42. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 30.
43. Hearings on HR. 5499, supra note 8, at 58.
44. TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 50-51.
45. Id. at 50-57.
46. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 42.
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than their white counterparts.47 As a result, white laborers came to re-
sent the competition, and organized labor unions excluded Japanese im-
migrants from the jobs their members wanted.4" To protect its members
from this competition, organized labor worked with the agricultural
community to secure exclusion legislation to limit or prevent further Jap-
anese immigration.49
As Japanese immigrants became more prosperous, the prejudices
against them, which politicians and the media had helped to fuel, grew
stronger .50 Anti-Japanese sentiment was soon manifested in anti-Japa-
nese legislation. Discriminatory legislation first manifested itself in local
ordinances. In 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education adopted a
resolution to segregate Asian from white students.51 School segregation
soon became a matter of international diplomacy, 2 and President Theo-
dore Roosevelt intervened in the board's actions.53 The President viewed
the San Francisco resolution as violating United States treaties guaran-
teeing Japanese citizens in the United States certain civil rights,54 and
therefore convinced the board to rescind its order.55
At the same time, the California legislature was entertaining the
passage of state-wide anti-Japanese legislation.5 6 In return for Califor-
nia's promise not to pass this legislation, President Roosevelt "promised
to do something about Japanese immigration."57 He kept his promise.
On March 14, 1907, Theodore Roosevelt issued an "Executive Order
47. D. DAVIS, BEHIND BARBED WIRE, THE IMPRISONMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS
DURING WORLD WAR 11 15 (1982).
48. Id. at 15. Anti-Japanese unions and organizations included: the International Sea-
men's Union of the Pacific, TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 33; the shoemakers' union, cook's
and waiter's unions, id. at 33; the American Federation of Labor (AFL), id. at 34; the Japhnese
and Korean Exclusion League (JKEL), id. at 35-36; the Associated Anti-Japanese Leagues, id.
at 36; the Anti-Jap Laundry League, id.; Union Labor Party of San Francisco, id. at 36; Japa-
nese Exclusion League, id. at 38; American Legion, id. at 43; The Native Sons of the Golden
West, id. at 46; California State Farm Bureau Federation, id. at 51; California State Grange,
and National Grange, id. at 54; Retail Grocer's Association, id. at 58; California State Federa-
tion of Labor, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30 at 34; California Joint Immigration
Committee, id. at 34; as well as others. See TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 32-67.
Few groups opposed anti-Japanese legislation. However, big business generally did not
favor anti-Japanese legislation because of its adverse effect on American trade with Japan.
TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 61.
49. TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 38.
50. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 14.
51. See Hearings on H.R. 5449, supra note 8, at 58-59.
52. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 33.






barring further Japanese immigration from Hawaii, Mexico and Can-
ada." 8 In 1907, the United States and Japan entered the "Gentlemen's
Agreement" 59 under which Japan agreed to limit immigration to the
United States to "laborers who [had] already been in America and to
parents, wives, and children of laborers already resident there."'
Although the "Gentlemen's Agreement" significantly curtailed Jap-
anese immigration, resentment and prejudice toward the Japanese con-
tinued to grow." In 1913, California enacted its own anti-Japanese
legislation. The 1913 California Alien Land Act62 prevented non-citi-
zens from buying agricultural land or leasing it for more than three
years.6 Although racially neutral on its face, the law was clearly aimed
at Japanese and Chinese immigrants.' Not only were these two groups
prominent in agriculture, but they also could not become United States
citizens because of a 1790 immigration law which provided that only
"free whites" could become naturalized citizens.6" They were thus effec-
tively prohibited from purchasing agricultural land or leasing it for any
significant period.
Anti-Japanese sentiment subsided from 1914 to 1918 while Japan
fought alongside the United States in World War 1.66 However, by 1920,
the push for discriminatory legislation was once again at the forefront.67
In 1920, an initiative was passed in California which attempted to close
loopholes in the Alien Land Act of 1913.68 The initiative prevented fur-
58. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 33 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 34-36.
62. California Alien Land Act, ch. 113, 1913 Cal. Stat. 206, repealed by Act of Sept. 7,
1955, ch. 27, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 471.
63. Id.
64. The Japanese and Chinese were not specifically mentioned in the law. But the law
encompassed only "'aliens ineligible to citizenship,' a group limited to the [Japanese and Chi-
nese]." D. DAvis, supra note 47, at 17.
65. Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 59. The Alien Land Act's ineffectiveness soon
disappointed its proponents. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 34. The Alien
Land Act's purpose was thwarted by immigrants whose children were born in the United
States. Id. These children, as United States citizens, could own land. Id. Title would be
taken in a child's name, and his parents would control the property as the child's guardians.
Immigrants who did not have children merely vested title in those who were citizens. Id.
They also avoided the law by setting up corporations nominally headed by Caucasians; they
were then able to buy land through these corporations. D. DAvis, supra note 47, at 17. Fur-
thermore, since leasing land to the Japanese was still allowed, they continued to prosper as
tenant farmers. TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 51.
66. Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 59.
67. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 34-35.
68. Id. at 35.
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ther transfers and leases of land to Japanese nationals, "barred any cor-
poration in which Japanese held a majority of stock from leas[ing] or
purchas[ing] ... land, and prohibited immigrant parents from serving as
guardians for their minor children."6 9 Similar legislation was passed in
Arizona, Washington and Oregon.7'
Anti-Japanese legislation reached its zenith in 1924 when Congress
passed the Asian Exclusion Act 71 which terminated all Japanese immi-
gration to the United States.72 However, by that time, a significant Japa-
nese population already resided in this country.73 Many immigrants had
given birth to children who, by definition, were United States citizens.74
Despite discriminatory attitudes and legislation, many of these immi-
grants decided to make their home in the United States.7"
In the 1930's, Japan became a powerful and aggressive country.76
In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria.77 Later in the 1930's, Japan's inva-
sion of China, desertion of the League of Nations, abandonment of naval
limitation agreements and bombing of an American gunboat rekindled
fears of a Japanese invasion of the United States.78
The stage had been set for an American reaction against the west
coast Japanese if Japan took military action against the United States.
Years of anti-Japanese sentiment, hostility and prejudice provided the
catalyst for the evacuation and internment of the west coast Japanese
69. Id. at 35. Initiative No. 1, Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of California, 1921,
p. lxxxvii (repealed ch. 316 (1955)). See supra note 65 for a discussion of how the immigrants
worked around the Alien Land Act's provisions. California's initiative was enacted to close
loopholes in the Alien Land Act. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 35.
Although the initiative passed by an overwhelming majority, the initiative's guardian provision
was subsequently held unconstitutional. Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 59; PER-
SONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 35.
70. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 35.
71. Id. at 36; TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 28. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat.
153 (repealed 66 Stat. 279 (1952)).
72. Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 59-60. The Asian Exclusion Act of 1924 was
specifically aimed at Asian aliens because it prohibited immigration of individuals ineligible for
citizenship. Id. Since naturalized citizenship was limited to "free white persons" by a 1790
naturalization law, the 1924 Act excluded Asians from United States immigration. D. DAVIS,
supra note 47, at 17; Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 59. The 1924 Act was not
repealed as to Japanese immigration until 1952. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). Immigration
Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 66 Stat. 279 (1952)).
73. Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 60.
74. Iad; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment states:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Id.
75. Hearings on HR. 5499, supra note 8, at 60.
76. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 37.
77. TENBROEK, supra note 29, at 28.
78. Id. at 28-29.
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following the bombing of Pearl Harbor. "The seeds of suspicion and dis-
trust sown by pressure groups over the preceding quarter-century...
[resulted in] spontaneous hostile acts and expressions against resident
Japanese... [giving] a clear preview.., of the subsequent reaction...
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor."79 These anti-Japanese senti-
ments and stereotypes formed "the basis [on] which, in large part, the
wartime evacuation of the Japanese... was authorized, executed, and
approved."
80
B. World War II and the Internment of Those of Japanese Ancestry
Shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066.81 This order permitted the Sec-
retary of War and military commanders to issue civilian exclusion orders
barring all persons of Japanese ancestry, including United States citizens,
from certain west coast areas."2 The exclusion was ostensibly ordered
due to fear that those of Japanese ancestry were spies for the Japanese
government. 3 The military alleged that the internment was necessary
because it lacked the time to quickly and efficiently differentiate those
loyal to the United States from the disloyal.84 Approximately 120,000
79. Id. at 29.
80. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
81. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 2. Pearl Harbor was bombed on De-
cember 7, 1941. Executive Order No. 9066, issued February 19, 1942, authorized the Secre-
tary of War to prescribe military areas from which any person could be excluded. Exec. Order
No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943). Executive Order No. 9102 created the War Relocation
Authority (WRA) to carry out Executive Order No. 9066. Exec. Order No. 9102, 3 C.F.R.
1123 (1938-1943). The WRA was responsible for administration of the relocation centers.
Exec. Order No. 9102, § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. 1125 (1938-1943). See B. HOSOKAWA, NIsEI, THE
QUIET AMERICANS 257-82 (1969); PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 47-92.
82. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943). The exclusion area included parts
of Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30,
at xii. Notably, Hawaii was not included as part of the exclusion area. See id. at 16. Less than
2,000 of the 158,000 ethnic Japanese in Hawaii were interned. Id. at 16. Their sheer numbers
spared them from the treatment imposed on the west coast Japanese. D. DAVIS, supra note 47,
at 55. It would have been physically impossible to transport and guard so many. Id.
It is also interesting to note that no mass exclusion was ordered against German or Italian
citizens. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 3. German-American and Italian-
American loyalty was determined through individual hearings. Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 241 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Moreover, the British government held
loyalty hearings for 74,000 German and Austrian aliens within its borders within six months
after the war's outbreak. Only 2,000 were interned as enemy aligns. Id. at 242, n.16 (citing
Kempner, The Enemy Alien Problem in the Present War, 34 AM. J. INT'L LAW 443, 444-46
(1940)); H.R. REP. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 280-81 (1942).
83. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 7. See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
84. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943).
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people were excluded and interned in "relocation centers." 5 No proce-
dure for individual review was available to determine loyalty to the
United States.A Congress sanctioned the exclusion by enacting legisla-
tion making it a crime to disobey any exclusion order.17 And criminal
convictions ensued when orders were violated.8" The exclusion remained
in effect until December 1944.89
C. An Internee's Personal View of the Internment 90
This section of the Comment describes, from an internee's point of
85. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 2-3. These relocation centers were
"bleak barrack camps mostly in desolate areas of the West ... surrounded by barbed wire and
guarded by [armed] military police." Id. at 2.
86. Id. at 2-3.
87. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 3. Violation of an exclusion order was
a misdemeanor. The fine for such a violation was not to exceed $5,000 or imprisonment for
more than 1 year, or both, for each offense. Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173
(1942).
88. In Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court affirmed Gordon Hirabayashi's criminal convic-
tion for violating a curfew order restricting all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in certain
military zones to their place of residence between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 320 U.S. at 83-84,
105. A companion case to Hirabayashi, Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), affirmed
Mr. Yasui's criminal conviction for violating a similar curfew order. Id. at 116-17. Kore-
matsu, 320 U.S. 214, affirmed Mr. Korematsu's criminal conviction for remaining in San Le-
andro, California, contrary to Civil Exclusion Order No. 34. Id. at 215-16, 224. See infra
notes 137-68 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion and subsequent case his-
tory of the Hirabayashi, Korematsu and Yasui cases.
89. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 2. Exclusion ended after Roosevelt's
election in 1944 when the War Department terminated the exclusion order. Hohri v. United
States, 782 F.2d 227, 232 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc deniedper curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.
1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer case to the
Federal Circuit). Although military authorities had determined prior to the 1944 presidential
election that no further military justification for the internment existed, President Roosevelt
would not take any action toward terminating the exclusion until after the 1944 election for
fear it would adversely affect his voting strength in the West. Id.
Individual loyalty reviews were provided in February 1943. Id. at 232, n.5. However,
release was slow and piecemeal. Id. Furthermore, those whose release was authorized could
only live in places outside the exclusion areas. Id. They still could not return home. Due to
administrative delays, the last camp was not closed until March 1946, and detention for many
internees was prolonged until then. Id. at 232.
90. Because of the humiliation and shame, I could never tell my four children of my
true feelings about that event in 1942-I did not want my children to feel the burden
of shame and feeling of rejection by their fellow Americans. I wanted them to feel
that in spite of what was done to us, this was still the best place in the world to live.
Hearings on S. 2116 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services of
the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1984) (testimony of Dr.
Mary Oda, former interue.e) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2116]. Portions of the section entitled
An Internee's Personal View of the Internment were taken from Dr. Oda's testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Civil Service, Post Office and General Services. Information not cov-
ered in Dr. Oda's testimony was compiled from other sources, as indicated.
Dr. Oda was interned with her family in the relocation center at Manzanar, California.
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view, the conditions the internees were forced to endure and the intern-
ment's effects on them. In general, the following statements typify the
internees' experiences.91 By delineating the conditions and effects of the
internment, others hopefully will realize the severity of the harm com-
mitted by the United States government and, further, recognize that the
internees deserve compensation for the indignities and property losses
they suffered.
1. An internee's view
After the issuance of the exclusion orders, my family was given about
two weeks to sell our farm equipment and cars, rent the house and farm
and store our personal belongings.92 A particularly emotional problem was
what to do with our pets. We were, of course, not allowed to bring them
with us. Since we could not find any Caucasian friends to care for them,
our pets had to be destroyed; it was better than leaving them to starve."3
Before evacuation day, my father reported to a Civil Control Center where
he received instructions for the evacuation, a family number and identifi-
cation tags.94 We placed our family number on the identification tags,
which we each had to wear, as well as on our luggage. 95 We were allowed
Id. at 101. At the time of the evacuation, she had almost finished her first year of medical
school at the University of California at Los Angeles. Id. at 95. She later finished her medical
education at the Women's Medical College of Pennsylvania. Id. at 101.
See also Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 37 (citing Strobel, The Japanese Ameri-
cans-Is It Time to Say Sorry?, San Jose Mercury News, May 11, 1980 (California Today))
(Florence Yoshiwara's recollection that after being released from internment, she "like many
other Nisei, 'tried to be white.' "). For insight into the internment's effects on Japanese Ameri-
can citizens who were too young to understand what was happening when interned, see Hear-
ings on S. 2116, supra, at 93 (testimony of George Takei) (remembering being afraid, his
parents' tension and anxiety, and later once released from internment, the "gnawing sense of
shame"). For a contrary view of the evacuation and internment, see Hearings on S. 2116,
supra, at 380-87 (testimony of Mas Odoi) (former evacuee and 442nd Regimental Combat
Team purple heart veteran).
References in this Comment to Issei and Nisei refer to generations of ethnic Japanese in
the United States. Issei are the immigrants, or first generation, from Japan. PERSONAL JUS-
TICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 2. Nisei are the Issei's sons and daughters, or in other words,
the first generation born in the United States. Id.
91. Of course experiences varied due to health and financial status prior to internment and
individual susceptibilities to conditions in the relocation centers. This section was written in
the first person to emphasize the intemment's consequences on individuals.
92. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 96. Some were given as little as 72 hours to
evacuate. S. REP. No. 202, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987). Many were forced to sell belong-
ings at a fraction of their value. D. DAvis, supra note 47, at 48-49.
93. See E. IsHiGo, LONE HEART MOUNTAIN 5 (1972).
94. D. DAvis, supra note 47, at 47, 56.
95. Id.
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to take only what we could carry. 96 We then assembled at temporary de-
tention centers, usually hastily converted county fairgrounds, race tracks
and livestock exhibition halls.97 We remained there until the relocation
centers were built.
98
My family was eventually transferred to the relocation center at
Manzanar, California. 99 When we arrived, I was dismayed at the sight of
the camp; it looked exactly like a prison. The camp was surrounded by
barbed wire and watch towers. Military police with guns patrolled the
are a.o I was accustomed to living in a comfortable four bedroom
house-the cramped eight cot room was stifling. 01 My family of nine
shared this single room with an elderly couple. 102 The room was approxi-
mately twenty by twenty-five feet and had no inner wall. Open studs ex-
posed two by four's, and the floor was wooden with one-half inch gaps
between the planks. 3 The winds blew layers of sand and dust up through
the floors into the room. 11 The room was not furnished. 1 05 We slept on
96. Id. at 47-48. The internees were only allowed to bring clothing, bedding, linens,
kitchen utensils and personal effects. Id.
97. D. DAviS, supra note 47, at 51. The assembly "centers [were] circled by barbed wire
fences patrolled by armed military police." Id. At the Santa Anita Assembly Center, only
four days separated the removal of the horses from the stalls that were soon to house the
evacuees. Id. at 60.
98. B. HosoKAwA, supra note 81, at 343.
99. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 101. Ten relocation centers were established:
Poston and Gila in Arizona; Manzanar and Tule Lake in California; Heart Mountain in Wyo-
ming; Minidoka in Idaho; Topaz in Utah; Granada in Colorado; Rohwer and Jerome in Ar-
kansas. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 67. These centers were located in desolate areas having
severe weather conditions. Id. at 68. For example, in Minidoka, the average temperature in
the summer was 110 degrees. Id. At Tule Lake, winter temperatures were often well below
zero. Ia at 69.
Other camps were also established. Citizen internees suspected of invoking mass demon-
strations at the relocation camps were transferred to and held at WRA isolation camps located
at Moab, Utah and Leupp, Arizona. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at xii, 179.
The Justice Department also controlled camps in Santa Fe, New Mexico; Bismarck, North
Dakota; Crystal City, Texas; and Missoula, Montana. Id. at xii. These camps held German
and Italian nationals whom the FBI suspected of spying, east coast German aliens whom the
Justice Department thought dangerous, and a small number of German-American citizens.
Id. at 284. They also held axis nationals deported from Latin American countries, id. at 307
(citing Barnhart, Japanese Internees from Peru, 31 PAC. HIsT. REv. 169-78 (1962)) and alien
internees suspected of invoking mass demonstrations at the relocation centers. Id. at 179.
100. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 99.




105. Id. Each room at the Heart Mountain camp was scantily furnished with cots, two
blankets for each occupant, a coal stove and a bucket and broom. E. ISHIO, supra note 93, at
20.
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straw which we stuffed into bags. 10 6 Later, my little brother made make-
shift chairs and a table from a pile of scrap lumber. '1
7
Life in the camp was "communal. " The bathrooms and showers were
located in separate barracks from our living quarters. 08 No partitions sep-
arated the toilets in the bathrooms. 09 There was a total lack ofprivacy for
basic intimate functions. I" Only a thin dividing partition, not entirely
reaching from floor to ceiling, separated our room from other family
units. 1" Families did not dine together in their rooms; we were expected
to eat at mess halls. "12
The evacuation's emotional and physical toll was great."3 Neverthe-
less, we eventually managed to set up a "normal" life. The War Reloca-
tion Authority (WRA) allowed us to elect figurehead governing bodies to
facilitate communications with them. "II Although private businesses were
106. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 98.
107. Id.
108. See E. ISHIGO, supra note 93, at 25.
109. Id.; See also Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 98.
110. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 98.
111. Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 69.
112. See PERSONAL JuSTIcE DENIED, supra note 30, at 162.
113. Dr. Oda's family was one which suffered greatly during the internment. Dr. Oda
developed heart problems during the internment. She attributed them to the submerged anger
and frustration she felt at being forced to leave all that was familiar. Hearings on S. 2116,
supra note 90, at 99. Her younger sister was placed in a mental institution for five months
after suffering a nervous breakdown. Id. at 100. The severe storms and wind in the Manzanar
area caused Dr. Oda's older sister to develop bronchial asthma. Id. She died at twenty-six
when her condition became incurable. Id.
Dr. Oda's oldest brother developed stomach cancer when he was thirty, three years after
evacuation. Id. He died after surgery. Id. Dr. Oda attributed her brother's cancer to a poor
daily diet consisting of pickled vegetables, rice and dried fruit preserved with sulfur. From this
diet, Dr. Oda concluded that her brother developed an intestinal obstruction which eventually
caused stomach cancer. Id. At Heart Mountain, the internees were provided with a diet of
"salted fish, turnips, some low-grade meat, cabbage, beans, potatoes and rice." E. ISHIGO,
supra note 93, at 38.
Dr. Oda's father, like her eldest sister, was sensitive to the ever present winds and dust at
Manzanar. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 100. He died from nose and throat cancer
stemming from constant nasal irritation. Id. Dr. Oda's family had entered camp in good
health, yet her sister, brother and father died within seven months of each other, three years
after evacuation. Id.
Not all deaths were natural. For example, military police panicked and killed two people
during a riot at the Manzanar Camp. D. DAviS, supra note 47, at 80-81. And an elderly
internee was shot and killed in broad daylight at the Topaz camp when he went too close to
the camp's outer fence. Id. at 79.
See also Hearings on H.R. 5499, supra note 8, at 35 (quoting California Congressman
Norman Mineta who was interned at Heart Mountain, Wyoming: "It was like being the victim
of a rape .... You don't want to talk about it, but you can't forget it. You know that you are
the innocent victim, but all of a sudden you become the guilty one.").
114. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 72. These governing councils had no real power. Id.
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not allowed, we set up a variety of stores and services based on the coopera-
tive system. 
115
Some of us setup drama and poetry groups.116 We also published our
own camp newspaper which was unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, cen-
sored heavily. 117 We were allowed to receive mail from "the outside." It
was of course censored. 118 Any forbidden items, such as razors, flashlights,
electric irons or radios found in incoming packages were confiscated.119
Although Japanese language Bibles and dictionaries were allowed, all
other Japanese language literature was prohibited.120
We helped establish schools for the children. 121 Those of us who were
qualified taught in the schools alongside WRA instructors.122 Besides
teaching positions, the WRA provided a variety of other jobs for those of us
who wanted them. 123 Jobs were available in administrative offices, mess
halls, laundries and health clinics, as well as other places. 124 Some of us
worked in WRA factories where we produced materials, such as camou-
flage nets, needed for the war. 2 Our pay scale for these jobs was low. 126
Eventually, the government made provisions for releasing some of
us. 127 1 was released on a special student program. 28 My three living
115. Id.
116. Id. at 73.
117. Id. at 63.
118. Id. at 77.
119. E. ISHIGO, supra note 93, at 9; D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 77.
120. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 63. The Issei often did not read English. The prohibition
against Japanese language literature was particularly hard on them. At Manzanar, speaking
Japanese in public meetings was forbidden. A. BOSWORTH, supra note 1, at 151.
121. See B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 81, at 348-50.
122. Id.
123. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 73.
124. Id.; E. ISHIGO, supra note 93, at 24.
125. A. BoswoRTH, supra note 1, at 147-48.
126. The pay scale was as follows: unskilled labor, $8.00/month; skilled labor, $12.00/
month; and for professionals such as doctors, dentists, nurses and technicians, $16-$19/month.
Id. at 146; D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 63. Internees were paid far less than their Caucasian
WRA personnel counterparts, even though WRA personnel were often less qualified. Id.
Although the wages were low, internees found it necessary to work because each family's $7.50
monthly allowance was rarely sufficient to pay for clothes and other necessities the government
did not provide. Id.
127. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 101. Release began in fall, 1942. D. DAVIS,
supra note 47, at 83. However, before release, each individual needed an FBI security clear-
ance "to assure host communities the [evacuee was] 'loyal.'" B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 81, at
355. Release to banned exclusion areas was, of course, not allowed. D. DAVIS, supra note 47,
at 88. To speed release, in February 1943 the WRA determined that loyalty oaths should be
given to Nisei army volunteers. Id. at 87. These loyalty oaths were contained in a question-
naire that all internees, whether applying for release or not, were required to complete. Id.
The "loyalty" questions read: "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United
States, in combat duty, wherever ordered?" and "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the
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brothers were released to serve in the United States Armed Forces.2 9
Others obtained their freedom by agreeing to work outside the exclusion
areas."13 Some, especially the elderly, however, remained interned until
unconditional release was announced in December 1944.131
United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any and all attack by
foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese
emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?" Id. See D. DAVIS, supra
note 47, at 87-90 and B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 81, at 364-65 for discussions of the problems
these two questions created. A "yes" answer to both questions was required to be eligible for
army enlistment or camp leave. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 87.
128. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 101-02. By fall 1942, hundreds of Nisei students
were released to attend school under the National Student Relocation Council's authority. B.
HOSOKAWA, supra note 81, at 355.
129. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 102. See supra note 127. For a short discussion
of the important role Japanese Americans played as interpreters in the Army Intelligence Ser-
vice, see D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 98-99. For a discussion of their role as combat soldiers in
the highly decorated all Japanese American combat units of the 442nd Regimental Combat
Team and the 100th Infantry Battalion, see id. at 100-12.
130. See supra notes 127-28.
131. On Sunday, December 17, 1944, the WRA announced that all camps would be closed
by the end of 1945. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 123; P. IRONS, supra. note 6, at 345. This
announcement preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944),
by one day. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 123. In Ex parte Endo, the Supreme Court held that
the WRA did not have authority to detain Mitsuye Endo, a concededly loyal Japanese Ameri-
can citizen, and that unconditional release was warranted. 323 U.S. at 302-04. The Court,
however, avoided deciding whether detention was unconstitutional. Id. at 297. Had the WRA
not announced the closing of the camps, the Endo decision would have required the WRA to
release all loyal internees. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 123. See P. IRONS, supra note 6, at
99-100 for a discussion of how Mitsuye Endo was chosen by her attorney to challenge govern-
mental detention.
Final release from camps was not easy for the internees. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at
126-30. Some had been interned for as long as four years. See A. BOSWORTH, supra note 1, at
254-57 (chronology showing that the first large group of internees was moved to the Manzanar
Assembly Center on March 22, 1942 and that the Tule Lake Center was closed on March 20,
1946). Many internees, especially the elderly, were afraid to leave the camps. D. DAVIS, supra
note 47, at 128. And once they did leave, many were met with hostility. Id. at 128-29. Fur-
thermore, they had nothing to return to. Id. at 126. Stored property had been taken or van-
dalized. Id. at 127-28. Their homes and former jobs were gone. Id. at 126. Real property had
been taken or foreclosed on to pay for delinquent property taxes or mortgage payments. PER-
SONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 117, 127-29, 133.
One estimate indicated economic losses due to the internment, in 1945 dollars, of between
$108 million to $164 million in income and between $11 million to $206 million in property.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 27 (edited and printed by the Japa-
nese American Citizens League 1983). These figures do not include amounts compensated
under the Japanese American Evacuatin Claims Act. See infra notes 283-89 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act. In 1983 dollars,
adjusted only for inflation, the total losses are between $810 million and $2 billion. Id. The
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco valued property losses at $400 million in 1942 dollars.
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 120; D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 138. The
CWRIC, however, questioned this figure as unsubstantiated. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED,
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After release, life was especially hard on my mother. When she re-
turned to our former home, everything was gone. 132 As a result, my
mother, a former teacher in Japan, was forced to work as a farm stoop
laborer. 133 With the $1,800 eventually received from the government for
the family's losses, my mother bought the gravestone under which she bur-
ied the ashes of my father, eldest brother and sister who had died during
the internment. 1
34
2. Effect of the internment
Relocation and internment was not a "mere inconvenience to Japa-
nese-Americans."' 131 Yet, most of the internees bore this indignity with-
out protest. They "held to traditional Japanese attitudes of obedience to
authority and acceptance of fate."'136 However, a few did challenge the
curfew and exclusion orders. These challenges are discussed in the next
section.
D. Constitutional Challenges to the Curfew and Exclusion Orders:
The Hirabayashi and Korematsu Cases
In Hirabayashi v. United States,137 decided in June 1943, the defend-
supra note 30, at 120. Of the $148 million claimed under the Evacuation Claims Act, the
government only paid $37 million. Id. at 118. Because of inflation and because the govern-
ment based its payments on the 1942 dollar, the internees were actually compensated at the
rate of 10 cents on the dollar. D. DAvIs, supra note 47, at 139; Dubro, The Japanese-Ameri-
can Internment, 3 CAL. LAW. 25, 31 (1983).
The discrepancies in estimated losses have resulted from lack of records. PERSONAL JUS-
TICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 118-19. The internees' personal records were lost along with
other property left behind. Id. at 119. They understandably did not bring records to the
camps with them; their main concern was to bring necessities such as food, medicine and
clothing. State and federal records have also been lost. "[U]nder Federal and State codes,
most of the Government records of 1942... have been destroyed pursuant to law." Id. (foot-
note omitted). The Internal Revenue Service's income tax return records were destroyed prior
to 1948 when compensation under the Evacuation Claims Act began. Id. at 118.
Despite these losses, the government provided only minimal assistance to help evacuees
adjust to outside life. Id. at 241-42; D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 126-28. The government gave
the internees train fare and a $25.00 allowance. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at
241. Once they arrived at their destinations, they often could not find housing because of
postwar shortages and discrimination. Id. Discrimination also often blocked employment in
other than menial jobs. Id. at 242.
132. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 96.
133. Id. at 103.
134. Id. See infra note 287 for a discussion of compensation under the American-Japanese
Evacuation Claims Act.
135. 133 CONG. REC. H7557 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Mineta).
136. D. DAVIS, supra note 47, at 56.
137. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). The Court considered only the constitutionality of the curfew
order and not the defendant's conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control Station in
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ant's criminal conviction for violating a curfew order imposed on those
of Japanese ancestry was upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress'
and the President's war powers. 13  The Supreme Court held that it
would defer to the military's judgment so long as the decision to enact
the curfew order was rationally related to the circumstances of the situa-
tion. 139 The Court, therefore, relied on the military's assertion that no
prompt and adequate means existed to differentiate disloyal persons of
Japanese ancestry from the loyal. 1"
In December 1944, the Supreme Court again upheld the criminal
conviction of a United States citizen of Japanese ancestry for violating a
military exclusion order in Korematsu v. United States.14 1 The defendant
had been found guilty of remaining in an area declared off-limits to those
of Japanese ancestry, in violation of Exclusion Order No. 34.142 In af-
firming this conviction, the Korematsu Court relied heavily on
Hirabayashi. 143
preparation for evacuation from a military exclusion area. The Court reasoned that since the
defendant's three month sentences for each violation were to run concurrently, it would be
unnecessary to consider the failure to report conviction if the curfew order conviction was
sustained. Id. at 85.
Mr. Hirabayashi violated a curfew order requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry resid-
ing in certain areas to remain in their residences between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (1942) [hereinafter Curfew Order]. Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 57 required all persons of Japanese ancestry within specified areas to
report for registration at designated Civil Control Stations. 7 Fed. Reg. 3725 (1942).
Hirabayashi was an upstanding citizen and an exemplary student enrolled at the Univer-
sity of Washington. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1447 (W.D. Wash.
1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). He was also a YMCA
leader and a Boy Scout. Id. He was a native-born American citizen, had never been to Japan
and had never corresponded with anyone in Japan. Id. Hirabayashi's only connection with
Japan was his ancestry. See id. Hirabayashi explained that the reason he did not report to the
civilian control center or obey the curfew order was because he felt the orders were "unconsti-
tutional and violated his rights as an American citizen and that... to obey them voluntarily
would have been a waiver of his rights." Id.
Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), was the companion case to Hirabayashi. In
Yasui, an American-born attorney of Japanese ancestry purposely violated the curfew order to
test its constitutionality. Id. at 116-17. The Supreme Court relied on Hirabayashi to find the
curfew order constitutional even as to United States citizens. Id. at 117. Thus, Yasui's convic-
tion was sustained, although the judgment was vacated to allow the district court to strike its
finding that Yasui had lost his United States citizenship. Id.
138. Id. at 101-02.
139. Id. at 103-04.
140. Id. at 99.
141. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
142. Id. at 215-16. The constitutionality of the military's exclusion order, which was not
reached by the Hirabayashi Court, was decided in Korematsu. Id. at 218-19.
143. Id. The court in dictum indicated that the burden of being interned was part of the
responsibilities of citizenship.
In [upholding the exclusion order], we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed
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The Korematsu Court held that because it could not reject the mili-
tary's claim that it was impossible to quickly and efficiently distinguish
the loyal from the disloyal, the temporary exclusion of all persons of Jap-
anese ancestry from the west coast was constitutionally permissible.
144
The Court cited the presence of "real military dangers," the "military
urgency" of the situation and the fact that "time was short" as justifica-
tions for the exclusion.145 The Court refused to second-guess the govern-
ment's assertion that the exclusion was justified by military urgency; it
would not "-by availing [itselfj of the calm perspective of hindsight-
now say that at [the time Hirabayashi was convicted] these actions were
unjustified." 146 The Court was content to let the military's justification
for the exclusion stand as the basis of its decision without carefully ana-
lyzing the reasons behind the exclusion orders.147
III. RECENT ACTION
A. The Re-opening of the Hirabayashi Case
Over forty years after the Supreme Court affirmed his criminal con-
victions for violating curfew and exclusion orders during World War II,
Gordon Hirabayashi filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis 148 re-
questing that the court vacate his convictions. 149 The district court va-
by it upon a large group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and
war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel
the impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as
well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier.
Id. at 219.
144. Id. at 218-19.
145. Id. at 223-24.
146. Id.
147. Ironically, Justice Black, writing for the Court stated in dictum: "Our task would be
simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a
concentration camp because of racial prejudice." Id. at 223.
148. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary writ that allows a convicted criminal
defendant, even long after he has served his sentence, to have his conviction vacated to correct
fundamental errors or prevent manifest injustice. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982); United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), a federal district court
has power to issue a writ of error coram nobis). To avail himself of the writ of coram nobis, the
petitioner must meet certain requirements. The petitioner must: 1) bring the petition in the
court where he was convicted; 2) demonstrate that a more usual remedy is not available; 3) sat-
isfy the case and controversy requirement of article III by showing that he presently suffers
adverse consequences from the conviction; 4) show valid reasons existed for not attacking the
conviction earlier; 5) show that the error was fundamental; and 6) show that a different result
was probable had the error not been made. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445,
1454-55 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (citations omitted), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1987).
149. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. 1445. The re-opening of the Hirabayashi case was made
possible by discoveries made by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
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cated Hirabayashi's conviction for violating the exclusion order, but
upheld the conviction for violating the curfew order.150 In vacating the
Civilians (CWRIC). Id. at 1455-56. The CWRIC was established by Congress in 1980. Com-
mission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, Pub. L. No. 96-317, 94 Stat.
964 (1980). The commission was established because "no significant study ha[d] been done by
the Government to determine the extent of any civil rights violations" during the internment,
H.R. REP. No. 1146, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980), and to investigate a Senate Committee's
finding that the "[ilnternees were deprived of their liberty and property apparently based on
their ethnic origins alone." S. REP. No. 751, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). Therefore, one
purpose of the commission was to investigate the internment and its impact. PERSONAL JUS-
TICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 1. The commission was also to recommend appropriate reme-
dies. Id.
In 1982, the CWRIC issued its findings in a report entitled PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED.
Id. The CWRIC found that no military necessity existed to exclude and intern the ethnic
Japanese. Id. at 18. The CWRIC recognized that the exclusion was based on "race prejudice,
war hysteria and a failure of political leadership." Id.
What made the reopening of Hirabayashi, and later Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.
Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984), possible was the finding that the War Department had purposely
concealed its reason for ordering the internment from the Justice Department. Hirabayashi,
627 F. Supp. at 1456-57; Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417-19. The War Department's asserted
reason for the internment was lack of time to separate loyal from disloyal ethnic Japanese. Id.
at 1449-52. The person who determined that military necessity required exclusion was Lieu-
tenant General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command. Id.
at 1448, 1456. However, his actual reason for ordering the exclusion was that it was impossi-
ble to distinguish loyal from disloyal ethnic Japanese, not that "there was insufficient time in
which to make such a determination." Id. at 1449. General DeWitt's reasoning was purposely
omitted from the War Department's final report. Id. at 1449-52. The Justice Department
therefore relied on erroneous information when it prepared its brief to the Supreme Court
opposing Hirabayashi's appeal. Id. at 1454. Thus, the fundamental error that allowed the
district court to grant Hirabayashi's petition for writ of coram nobis was the War Depart-
ment's failure to disclose the true reason for the exclusion order. Id. at 1456. The district
court found that:
[i]f the asserted ground [had been known] by the Supreme Court to be the impossibil-
ity of separating the loyal from the disloyal, the Supreme Court would have found
itself in an area of inquiry where its collective wisdom and ... experience were far
greater than... DeWittr's]. The justices ... were intimately familiar with the pro-
cess of factual determinations.... [Ihe Supreme Court would not have had to defer
to military judgment because this particular problem, separating the loyal from the
disloyal, was one calling for judicial, rather than military, judgment.
Id. at 1457. For a thorough discussion of the War Department's concealment, see P. IRONS,
supra note 6, at 186-218.
Minoru Yasui also filed a writ of error coram nobis. Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d
1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1985). In his petition, Mr. Yasui requested the court to declare the cur-
few order which he had been convicted of violating unconstitutional, to dismiss his indictment
and vacate his conviction. Id. at 1498. The district court dismissed Yasui's indictment and
vacated his conviction, without finding that his constitutional rights had been violated. Id.
Yasui appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a finding that his constitutional
rights had been violated. Id. The court of appeals held that Yasui's appeal was untimely and
remanded the case to allow him to show excusable neglect. Id. at 1499-1500. The appeal,
however, was subsequently dismissed as moot due to Mr. Yasui's death. Hirabayashi, 828
F.2d at 594 n.4.
150. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1457. To grant a writ of coram nobis, the court must find
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exclusion order, the district court found that the War Department's fail-
ure to disclose information in 1943 when the Supreme Court upheld
Hirabayashi's conviction prejudiced the defendant. 51
In the government's opposition to Hirabayashi's original appeal to
the Supreme Court, the Justice Department's attorneys assumed and ar-
gued that the reason for the exclusion was the need for prompt action.152
The "whole thrust of the government's argument... was that there was
not sufficient time to make a differentiation between the loyal Japanese
and those who might be disloyal." 15 3 However, the need for prompt ac-
tion was not the reason given by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt
154
in his final report to the War Department urging exclusion.1 55 DeWitt
stated that his reason for the exclusion was "the impossibility of separat-
ing the loyal persons from the disloyal ones no matter how much time was
devoted to that task," not that insufficient time existed to make the deter-
a fundamental error that prejudiced petitioner's case. See supra note 149. In Hirabayashi, the
court reasoned that the fundamental error that allowed Hirabayashi's conviction for violating
the exclusion order to be overturned was not "fundamental" as to the curfew order. 627 F.
Supp. at 1457. The court held that non-disclosure of the true reason for the exclusion was not
a fundamental error with respect to the curfew violation since even if it had been revealed, it
would not have changed the Supreme Court's ruling. Id. The "reason for the exclusion did
not significantly undermine the earlier issuance of the curfew order." Id. The error was there-
fore not prejudicial as to the curfew violation, and a writ of coram nobis on that conviction was
not appropriate. Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court had "erred in
distinguishing between the validity of the curfew and exclusion convictions." Hirabayashi, 828
F.2d at 608. The court reasoned that just because the curfew order was a lesser restriction on
freedom than the exclusion order, it did not necessarily follow that the Supreme Court would
have found the curfew order constitutional and the exclusion order unconstitutional. Id. at
608. Both restrictions were " 'equally based on... the difficulty of classifying American citi-
zens ....' Id. (citing Edward Ennis' testimony at an evidentiary hearing before the district
court in Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1145 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987)).
151. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1457.
152. Id. at 1456.
153. Id. This statement was made by Edward Ennis, Director of the Alien Enemy Control
Unit of Department of Justice, in charge of preparing the government's brief before the
Supreme Court in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp.
at 1449. Ennis testified during the hearing on Hirabayashi's petition for writ of coram nobis
that if the real reason for the internment had been known in 1943, the government would have
had "'a very serious problem'" with its case; "it would have been 'very dangerous' to take
[the] position [that it was impossible to distinguish loyal from disloyal ethnic Japanese] before
the Supreme Court." Id. at 1456.
154. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was the Commanding General of the Western
Defense Command. DeWitt recommended the exclusion to Secretary of War, Henry L. Stim-
son. In turn, President Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on Secretary Stimson's recommendation
to order the exclusion. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 6.
155. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1456.
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rination.1 56 DeWitt's conclusion clearly was based on his expressed dis-
trust of the Japanese as a race."5 7
DeWitt's original report was intentionally kept from the Justice De-
partment.1 58 The Justice Department therefore prepared its brief to the
Supreme Court in the original Hirabayashi case assuming that the basis
for the exclusion was the need for prompt action."5 9 In ruling on Mr.
Hirabayashi's petition for writ of coram nobis, the district court found
that if DeWitt's reason for the exclusion had been known at the time, the
"Supreme Court would not have had to defer to military judgment."
16
The loyal could have been separated from the disloyal-"with very little
effort the determination could have been made that tens of thousands of
native-born Japanese Americans-infants in arms, children of high
school age or younger, housewives, the infirm and elderly-were loyal
and posed no possible threat to this country."1 61  The district court
therefore vacated Hirabayashi's conviction for violating the exclusion or-
der because the government's concealment of its reason for ordering the
156. Id. (emphasis added). DeWitt's personal prejudices motivated his decision to order
the exclusion. In his recommendation to Stimson, DeWitt stated:
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration.
The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation
Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have be-
come "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted.... It... follows that along
the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies of Japanese extraction, are at
large today.
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 66 (quoting J. DEWrrT, FINAL REPORT: JAP-
ANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 34 (1942)). "'There are indications that these
are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no
sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will
be taken."' Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per
curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with
instructions to transfer case to the Federal Circuit). DeWitt's racial animus was further shown
in his statements before a Congressional committee: "[W]e must worry about the Japanese all
the time until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as
he is allowed in this area-problems which I don't want to have to worry about." PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 66.
157. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 66.
158. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1454. The War Department destroyed copies of DeWitt's
final report and placed any remaining records in a confidential file. P. IRONS, supra note 6, at
211-12. The revised final report in which the War Department changed its reason for the
exclusion from inability to distinguish the loyal from disloyal to insufficient time to make the
determination was not provided to the Justice Department. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at
1449-52. The War Department did not release the revised final report until January 1944,
seven months after the Supreme Court's decision in Hirabayashi. P. IRONS, supra note 6, at
212. For the actual revisions made in DeWitt's original report to disguise the true reason for
the exclusion, see Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1449-54.
159. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1454.
160. Id. at 1457.
161. Id. at 1456. See also P. IRONS, supra note 6, at 208.
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exclusion had prejudiced Hirabayashi's case."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently vacated Hiraba-
yashi's curfew order conviction as well. 163 The court of appeals reasoned
that the district court had erred by distinguishing the curfew order from
the exclusion order on the basis that the curfew was a lesser restriction
on freedom."' "It does not follow.., that the Supreme Court would
have made such a distinction had it been aware of the suppressed
evidence." 6 '
B. Vacating Korematsu's Conviction
Korematsu, likewise petitioned the court for writ of error coram
nobis on the basis of governmental misconduct.. 66 On April 19, 1984,
the District Court of the Northern District of California vacated Kore-
matsu's conviction for violating an exclusion order. 167 The court con-
cluded that since relevant evidence concerning the military necessity for
the internment had been withheld during the original proceeding, Kore-
matsu's petition should be granted.
1 68
C. The Class Action Suit-Hohri v. United States
In addition to Hirabayashi 6 9 and Korematsu,170 a class action was
162. Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1454, 1457-58. While no evidence indicated that the
Justice Department knowingly concealed DeWitt's reason for the exclusion, the district court
charged the government with the "concealment because it was information known to the War
Department, an arm of the government." Id.
163. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 591.
164. Id. at 608.
165. Id. See supra note 150.
166. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The govern-
ment filed a counter-motion to vacate Korematsu's conviction and dismiss the underlying in-
dictment. Id. at 1410. In its response, the government requested that the court grant
Korematsu's petition without looking into the merits of his contentions. Id. Apparently, the
government agreed that the conviction should be vacated, but was unwilling to confess that it
had previously been wrong. Id. at 1413. The court, however, found that a limited review was
necessary. Id. at 1412.
167. Id. at 1406, 1420.
168. Id. at 1419. The relevant evidence withheld from the Court was information known to
the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of the Navy and the Justice De-
partment regarding the lack of military necessity for the internment. Id. at 1418-19. The
Justice Department and military officials other than General DeWitt considered this informa-
tion reliable. Id. at 1418. However, the government's brief, and the State of California's brief
as amicus curiae for the government, relied heavily on DeWitt's revised report. Id. at 1418 &
n.9. Contrary relevant evidence was purposely omitted from the government's brief. Id. at
1418. "Thus, the Court had before it a selective record." Id. at 1419. For a more complete
discussion of the evidence withheld, see supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
169. 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1987).
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filed in 1983 against the United States on behalf of all internees and, if no
longer living, their representatives. The named plaintiffs were nineteen
internees and descendants of internees and an organization of Japanese
Americans."'1 The complaint, which contained twenty-two causes of ac-
tion, requested compensatory damages for each tort claim and $10,000
for each of the other causes of action based on violations of the Constitu-
tion and Civil Rights Acts." 2 The United States moved to dismiss the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, the gov-
ernment argued plaintiffs' actions were barred either because the statutes
of limitations had run or because sovereign immunity protected it from
suit."13 Additionally, the government claimed that the exclusive remedy
for claims arising from the internment was the American-Japanese Evac-
uation Claims Act. 7 4
The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss, hold-
ing that all plaintiffs' claims were barred either by sovereign immunity or
the statutes of limitations. 5 In dictum, the court indicated that the ap-
propriate avenue for redress would be through the legislature, especially
170. 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
171. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.
1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer case to the
Federal Circuit). The district court postponed class certification pending the outcome of the
government's motion to dismiss. If certified as defined, the class would include:
approximately 120,000 citizens and permanent residents, and representatives of such
persons no longer living, who were "subjected to forcible segregation, arrest, exclu-
sion, imprisonment, curfew and travel restrictions, deportation, loss of citizenship, or
other deprivations of their civil rights and liberties" because of their Japanese ances-
try pursuant to actions and orders of the United States.
Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 772 n.1 (citation omitted).
172. Id. at 773, 793.
173. Id.
174. Id. Approximately 25% of the $148 million in claims were paid. See P. IRONS, supra
note 6, at 348. And only 37% of the potential claims were actually filed. Id. See infra notes
283-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims
Act.
175. Hohni, 586 F. Supp. at 783, 795. See supra note 23 for a list of the constitutional
violations alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. The tort causes of action included negligence, inten-
tional law enforcement torts, constitutional violations sounding in tort and civil rights claims.
Id. at 793. Plaintiffs based the tort causes of action on the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 793. The district court held that even if
plaintiffs had complied with the FTCA's requirement that all FTCA claims be fied with the
appropriate governmental agency before bringing suit in federal court, the FrCA's two year
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982), would bar plaintiffs' claims. Hohr, 586 F.
Supp. at 793. On appeal, the court of appeals atffrmed this portion of the district court's
ruling. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 245-46 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per
curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with
instructions to transfer case to the Federal Circuit).
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since bills were pending that specifically addressed the problem of com-
pensating World War II internees.
17 6
1. The court of appeals decision
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.1 7 7 The ap-
pellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all causes of action,
except plaintiffs' fifth amendment takings claim.1 78  In their takings
claim, plaintiffs alleged that property taken by the government and
others during the internment violated their fifth amendment right not to
have property taken for public use without just compensation. 179 The
appellate court found that the Tucker Act waived the government's sov-
ereign immunity under the takings claim.180 Thus, said the court, if the
government's concealment of the internment's lack of military necessity
could be proven, "those individuals who have not received awards under
the [American-Japanese Evacuation] Claims Act should be free to press
[their takings claim] to its conclusion."
1 81
176. 586 F. Supp. at 795-96. See infra notes 290-323 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the pending bills.
177. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 256 (sitting on the panel were Judges Wright, Ginsburg and Mar-
key (Judges Wright and Ginsburg sat on the D.C. Circuit panel as did Chief Judge Markey of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation).
178. Id. at 244, 255-56.
179. Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 783; 782 F.2d at 242 & n.35. The appellate court held that "the
fact that the government forced [the internees] to give up actual possession and control of their
property suggests that it has committed a taking per se." 782 F.2d at 242 n.35. The fifth
amendment provides that no "private property [shall] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The property allegedly taken without just compensa-
tion included not only cameras, weapons, vehicles and radio transmitters, confiscated as "in-
struments of possible espionage and sabotage," but also bank deposit assets, crops and business
property. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 62; Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 783.
Losses also included equity not realized due to the sale of homes and businesses at distress-sale
prices, loss of homes and businesses left with caretakers, employees or others not interned who
later converted the property to their own use, lost or stolen personal property and loss of
business good will. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 30, at 117. See id. at 117-33 for a
general discussion of the internees' economic losses.
180. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 242. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982), "waives sov-
ereign immunity... for those claims founded on... provisions of the Constitution that create
substantive rights to money damages." 782 F.2d at 242 (citation and footnote omitted). Since
the takings clause provides such a substantive right, "there is no question that appellants have
stated a claim cognizable under the Takings Clause." Id. See supra note 19 for a discussion of
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987).
181. 782 F.2d at 256. One problem the court did not address is whether those who filed
under the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act but did not get full compensation should
also be allowed to press a takings claim. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act.
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Even though the court of appeals found that a viable cause of action
may have existed, the statute of limitations problem still remained.
182
The court found, however, that the statute of limitations on the takings
claim was effectively tolled until 1980 when it was first revealed that no
military necessity for the internment existed.1 83 The court found that
because of the Supreme Court's deference to the military's finding of mil-
itary necessity in the original internment cases, 84 "nothing less than an
authoritative statement by one of the political branches, purporting to
review the evidence when taken as a whole, could rebut" this defer-
ence.18 Thus, even if the internees had brought an action within the
statute of limitations, their claims would have "foundered upon the gov-
ernment's defense that evacuation and internment were required by mili-
tary necessity." ' 6 In other words, the internees realistically could not
have brought an action until the Court's deference to the War Depart-
ment's claim of military necessity was rebutted. The court of appeals
found that the "authoritative statement" rebutting military necessity was
issued in 1980 when Congress passed the Act creating the Commission
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC). 187 The
six year statute of limitations for the takings claim was therefore equita-
bly tolled until 1980.188 Because the Hohri case was filed prior to 1986,
when the statute of limitations on the takings claim would have run, the
takings claim was viable.
2. The denial of an en banc hearing
The government petitioned the court of appeals for a rehearing en
banc. In a per curiam order, the court denied the petition for rehear-
ing.189 Circuit Judge Bork wrote a dissenting opinion from the denial of
182. The statute of limitations for a takings claim is six years from the time that the "right
of action first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1982). At the time Hohri was originally filed,
approximately 40 years had passed since the alleged taking. 793 F.2d at 304 (Bork, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en bane).
183. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 252-53.
184. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943).
185. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 251.
186. Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 787.
187. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 253. The court found that "[a]t a minimum, the Act can be under-
stood to be a formal statement that Congress no longer believed that the explanation provided
by the military authorities for the internment program was adequate and that the issue should
be reopened." Id. See supra note 149 for a discussion of the CWRIC.
188. 782 F.2d at 253.
189. Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (6-5 decision),
vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer case to the Federal
Circuit).
April 1988] 1003
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:979
rehearing en banc with which Circuit Judges Scalia, Starr, Silberman and
Buckley joined.190
The dissent argued that the statute of limitations barred the intern-
ees' takings claim since the alleged taking had occurred forty years prior
to the filing of their complaint. 191 Congress' decision in 1980 expressing
its doubt about the military's justification for the internment by passing
the Act creating the CWRIC did not toll the statute of limitations. 192
The dissent objected to the panel majority's "contrived reasoning [be-
cause it] create[d] a rule of absolute and permanent judicial deference to
any claim of 'military necessity' "193 by finding that "nothing less than an
authoritative statement by one of the political branches.., could rebut'"
the court's deference to military judgment. 194 The dissent feared the ma-
jority's decision would result in "unthinking [judicial] acceptance of un-
supported [military] assertions."' 195 Judge Bork further argued that,
contrary to the majority's characterization, Hirabayashi196 and Kore-
matsu 197 did not reflect "an absolute deference to military judgment."'
198
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that even if an absolute deference
to the military's judgment was required, the takings claim could have
been brought before the statute of limitations had run, even if the statute
of limitations had not been tolled. 199 The dissent's rationale was that
since military necessity did not require the taking of property during the
war, the takings claim could have been brought at any time after the
cause of action had accrued.2" Therefore, under the dissent's reasoning,
concealment of military necessity would not toll the statute until there
was an "authoritative statement," even if, arguendo, such a statement
was required.2"1 Thus, the dissent found that it was for "the political
branches to make whatever reparations they deem appropriate.
'20 2
190. Id. Eleven Justices sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. See id. Five of the eleven Justices dissented. Id.
191. Id. at 305 (Bork, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 306-07 n.2 (Bork, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 305 (Bork, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Bork, J., dissenting) (quoting Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 251 (D.C.
Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded,
107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer case to the Federal Circuit).
195. Id. at 307 (Bork, J., dissenting).
196. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
197. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
198. Hohri, 793 F.2d at 305 (Bork, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 308-09 (Bork, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Bork, L., dissenting).
201. Id. at 305-06 (Bork, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 313 (Bork, J., dissenting). In essence, the dissent found that the panel majority
had "purchased freedom from the statute of limitations at an unacceptable price. A panel
1004
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3. The Supreme Court decision
Both the government and plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari, but only the government's petition was granted. °3 On
June 1, 1987, the Supreme Court, without discussing the merits of the
case, reversed the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sion on a jurisdictional issue.2"
The Supreme Court decided the case on the issue of whether the
Federal Circuit or the regional court of appeals "has jurisdiction over an
appeal from a Federal District Court's decision of a case raising both a
nontax claim under the... Tucker Act and a claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 2 °5 The Supreme Court interpreted "ambigu-
ous" statutory language in 28 U.S.C. section 1295(a)(2), which grants the
Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over certain cases involv-
ing the federal government.20 6 Based on language variations within that
subsection and the "special need for nationwide uniformity" in certain
areas of law, such as claims based on the Tucker Act,20 7 the Supreme
Court found that a case which presents both a nontax Tucker Act claim
and an FTCA claim may be appealed only to the Federal Circuit.20 8 The
Supreme Court therefore vacated the court of appeals' judgment and re-
manded the case with instructions to transfer the matter to the Federal
majority that so obviously disapproves of the wartime internment ought to have been more
reluctant to create a legal basis for rendering any similar future incident forever unreviewable
in any of its consequences." Id. at 309 (Bork, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the
majority based its decision primarily on "justice according to morality," not according to law.
Id. at 313 (Bork, J., dissenting). The dissent cautioned that justice according to morality was
not for the courts to administer, but for Congress and the President. Id. (Bork, J. dissenting).
The dissent also found that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 309
(Bork, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Bork stated that jurisdiction over the takings claim based
on the Tucker Act should be appealed to the Federal Circuit, not the regional court of appeals.
Id. at 309-10 (Bork, J., dissenting). For a thorough discussion of the jurisdictional issue, see
id. at 309-12 (Bork, J., dissenting); Hohri, 782 F.2d at 239-41, id. at 257-60 (Markey, C.J.,
dissenting).
203. Hohri v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 454 (1986). The State of California, the State of
Hawaii, the ACLU, Americans Friends Service Committee and Fred Korematsu filed amicus
curiae briefs on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Telephone interview with Mr. Williams, Supreme
Court Clerk (Mar. 4, 1987).
204. Hohri v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2246, 2249 (1987).
205. Id. at 2248.
206. Id. at 2250-51. The Federal Courts Improvement Act, which created the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, was enacted in 1982 to provide nationwide
uniformity in certain areas of law. Id. at 2251; 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982).
207. The Tucker Act includes claims based on contract and claims for money damages
"founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an execu-
tive department,.. . or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982); 107 S. Ct. 2252, n.4.
208. 107 S. Ct. 2253.
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To date, Congress210 and the judiciary have not provided adequate
compensation to those interned during World War II. The courts have
held that sovereign immunity bars claims against the government for al-
most all constitutional violations arising out of the internment. 211 How-
ever, Hohri v. United States212 may allow the internees to pursue a cause
of action against the government. Hohri is currently pending before the
Federal Circuit. Finally, pending legislation fails in many respects.21 3
The following section will discuss past and present attempts to compen-
sate the internees and propose both judicial and legislative solutions to
the problem.
209. Id. One obvious problem with the Court's refusal to treat the issues on the merits is
further delay. As recognized by Justice Blackmun, "[t]he issue on the merits probably will be
back in this Court once again months or years hence." Id. at 2254 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
One issue that may again be presented to the Supreme Court is whether the statute of limita-
tions may be equitably tolled on the internees' takings cause of action. See supra notes 178-88
and accompanying text. This Comment also proposes that the Supreme Court address
whether a cause of action for the non-takings claims can be pursued under Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See infra notes 214-82 and accompanying text.
After this Comment was sent to the printer, the Federal Circuit, in a per curiam opinion,
affirmed the District Court for the District of Columbia's decision dismissing plaintiffs' claims.
Hohri v. United States, No. 87-1635 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 1988) (WESTLAW, Ailfeds library,
1988 WL 45049). Plaintiffs intend to seek certiorari to the Supreme Court.
210. In 1948, Congress made a vain attempt to compensate the internees for their property
losses. American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1987 (1982). See supra
notes 283-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the American-Japanese Evacuation
Claims Act. In 1972, the Social Security Act was amended so Japanese Americans, who were
over the age of 18 when interned, were credited with having contributed to the Social Security
system during detention. 133 CONG. REc. H7579 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep.
McCandless); Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 231, 86 Stat. 1329,
1367-69 (1972). In 1978, the "Federal civil service retirement provisions were amended.., to
allow Japanese-American civil service retirement credit for the time spent in detention after
the age of 18." 133 CONG. Rnc. H7579 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. McCand-
less); Act of Sept. 22, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-382, 92 Stat. 727 (1978).
211. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer to the Federal
Circuit).
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 300-23 and accompanying text.
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B. Constitutional Claims
1. Non-takings claims
Presently, internees find it difficult to sue the federal government for
violation of their constitutional rights arising from the evacuation, relo-
cation and internment. Several factors prevent them from successfully
bringing such suits. First, the courts have been unwilling to imply a
cause of action against the federal government for its violations of an
individual's constitutional rights.214 Second, no statutory cause of action
exists whereby an individual may bring suit for non-takings constitu-
tional violations against the federal government. Third, even if Congress
provided or the courts implied a cause of action, the statute of limitations
probably would have run.215
a. implying a cause of action under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents
In Hohri v. United States,2" 6 the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals held that claims for violation of non-takings constitutional
rights were barred by sovereign immunity because Congress had not cho-
sen to waive sovereign immunity as to those claims.2" 7 The judiciary
214. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer to the Federal
Circuit).
215. Depending on the outcome of Hohri, the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled
on the takings issue.
216. 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.
1986), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer case to the
Federal Circuit.
217. Id. at 244. Sovereign immunity bars all claims for violation of constitutional rights
under the due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities clauses of the fifth
amendment; the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment; the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment; the rights to fair trial and counsel under the sixth
amendment; the press, speech, religion, petition and assembly clauses of the first amendment;
the prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws and the right to the writ of habeas
corpus under article I, section 9; and the protection from involuntary servitude under the
thirteenth amendment. Id. That the internees' constitutional rights were violated was not
disputed. See id. at 256 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (no one involved in the Hohri case disputed
that those of Japanese ancestry were wronged); Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8 (1977)
(President Ford stated that the evacuation was a national mistake and wrong); H.R. 442, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1987) (recognized that constitutional rights were violated).
The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for claims founded on statutes, regulations,
contracts or the Constitution which create substantive rights to money damages. Hohri, 782
F.2d at 242 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983)). But see supra note
19 for a discussion of the effect of a recent Supreme Court case holding that statutory recogni-
tion is not necessary for a takings cause of action.
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could, however, imply a cause of action for the constitutional violations
the internees suffered.21 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,2" 9 the
Supreme Court implied a cause of action for damages against agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for violation of the plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights,220 even though no statute or constitutional provision
expressly permitted a cause of action.221 In Bivens, federal agents entered
and searched plaintiff's home for narcotics without a search warrant or
probable cause. The agents handcuffed plaintiff in his wife and children's
presence, and threatened to arrest plaintiff's family. Plaintiff was subse-
quently taken from his home, interrogated, booked and visually strip
searched.222
The Bivens Court implied a private cause of action for violation of
plaintiff's constitutional rights for two reasons. First, it distinguished
power wielded by federal officials from that held by individuals. Because
a federal official possesses significantly greater authority, he has a
"greater capacity [to cause] harm. ' 223  For this reason, the Court re-
jected the government's argument that the fourth amendment serves
merely as a limitation on federal defenses to a state law claim.224 Bivens
instead held that the Constitution is "an independent limitation upon the
exercise of federal power" by federal officials.225
If the Constitution is such an "independent limitation" on federal
power, the Constitution should also limit the federal government's exer-
cise of that power. The government's authority to intern those of Japa-
218. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 390-91. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
221. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
222. Id. at 389.
223. Id. at 392.
224. Id. at 394. See infra note 225.
225. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394. The government argued that the right of privacy was a crea-
tion of state and not federal law. Id. at 390. Thus the government's argument was that the
action should have been brought in state court under state tort law. Id. If the federal agents
had acted unconstitutionally, then, they could not defend their actions by asserting that they
had validly exercised federal power. Id. at 390-91. They would be stripped of their "official"
capacity and stand before the law as private individuals. Id. at 391. If this was correct, the
"relationship between a citizen and a federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his authority
[would be] no different from the relationship between two private citizens." Id. at 391-92. The
Court rejected this argument because of the difference in power held by a government official
relative to a private individual. Id. at 392.
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nese ancestry under its war powers was at the time unquestioned, and the
resulting harm was enormous.226 As in Bivens, this inordinate power
should be limited by allowing a cause of action. The Constitution "guar-
antees to citizens ... the absolute right to be free from [constitutional
violations] carried out by virtue of federal authority., 227  Where the
wrong is monumental and affects many, a remedy limited to individual
officials is meaningless. Here, the officials responsible for the internment
are deceased. And even if alive, a judgment against an official would not
be an effective remedy since the official would not have the monetary
resources to compensate all those injured. To have an effective cause of
action, then, the internees must be able to sue the government itself. As
the Court held in Bell v. Hood,228 a cause of action should be implied
because a right without a remedy is no right at all.229
In addition, the Bivens Court reasoned that under the circum-
stances, equity justified implying a cause of action.23' The Bivens Court
implied a cause of action from the fourth amendment because no ade-
quate remedy would otherwise be available to an individual where federal
officials under claim of authority violated fourth amendment rights.2 3 '
The Court was concerned that a person could be faced with the anoma-
lous situation of being convicted of resisting arrest and yet not having a
cause of action if the arrest was unlawful.232 Unless the wrongfully ar-
226. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
227. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
228. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
229. See id. at 684-85.
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the neces-
sary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.
Id. at 684.
230. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95.
231. Id. The Bivens equity rationale has since been extended to other Constitutional provi-
sions. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979) (fifth amendment); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-96 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 916 (1978) (first amendment); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47,
50 (4th Cir. 1975); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1975); Yiamouyiannis v.
Chemical Abstracts Serv., 521 F.2d 1392, 1393 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983
(1978) (sixth amendment); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 161-62
(D.D.C. 1976) (right to counsel). Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 598 n.7 (1982).
232. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95.
The mere invocation of federal power by a federal law enforcement official will nor-
mally render futile any attempt to resist an unlawful entry or arrest by resort to the
local police; and a claim of authority to enter is likely to unlock the door as well....
"In such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of the judi-
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rested person was able to assert a cause of action, there would be "no
safety for the citizen.
''233
Similarly, when the government takes away constitutional rights by
asserting its war powers, there is little a person can do to protect himself.
For example, during World War II, those of Japanese ancestry were
forced to either comply with the government's orders or assert their con-
stitutional rights through the judicial system.234 However, the courts
barred them from successfully adjudicating their actions.235 Like the
plaintiff in Bivens, "[tihere remain[ed] ... but the alternative of resist-
ance, which... amount[ed] to [a] crime. ' 236 The Bivens equity argu-
ment is equally applicable to the internment cases because no adequate
remedy exists unless the judiciary implies a cause of action.237 Because
of the enormity of the wrong and the large number of people injured, the
only effective remedy is against the government itself. Thus, under Biv-
ens' equity argument, the internees should be entitled to seek relief from
the federal government for its violation of their constitutional rights.
i special factors counselling hesitation
Once the Bivens Court found that a cause of action could be implied,
the essential issue was whether plaintiff could redress his injury through
damages.23 8 Citing Marbury v. Madison,239 the Bivens Court held that a
plaintiff is entitled to money damages when his constitutional rights are
violated.2' The internees should be entitled to damages because, like
Bivens, their constitutional rights were violated.241
cial tribunals.... There remains to him but the alternative of resistance, which may
amount to crime."
Id. (citations omitted).
233. Id. at 394.
234. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
236. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
237. As previously discussed, Hohri may allow a takings cause of action. However, takings
claims and claims under the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act only provide compen-
sation for loss of real and personal property. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
Congress may soon provide a remedy. Bills are presently pending before the 100th Con-
gress which would redress the violations suffered by the internees. See supra notes 290-99 and
accompanying text.
238. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395.
239. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
240. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803)). "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id.
241. Equitable relief would obviously not be an appropriate remedy here since no one re-
mains interned or subject to exclusion orders. Once the alleged unconstitutional act has been
terminated, the only logical relief is money damages. Where equitable relief would be unavail-
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However, before the Bivens Court allowed a damage remedy, it
looked to see whether the case "involve[d] ... special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. ' 2 42 These
special factors may include: concern for depletion of the federal purse,243
separation of powers, 2" overburdening the judicial system 245 and sover-
eign immunity.246 In Carlson v. Green,247 the Court pinpointed an addi-
tional "special factor." Carlson interpreted Bivens' "special factors
counselling hesitation" to require an analysis of whether defendants
"enjoy[ed] such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to
suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be inappro-
priate. '24 8 An analysis of the above "special factors" is necessary to de-
termine whether the judiciary could justifiably imply a cause of action for
damages against the federal government for its violation of the internees'
constitutional rights during World War II.
Although the Bivens Court was willing to allow damages against
federal officials for violation of constitutional rights, the courts might not
be willing to create such a cause of action for damages against the federal
government. In Hohri2 49 the district court refused to imply a cause of
ing, it may come down to being a matter of "damages or nothing." Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
242. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
243. Id. "Congress [is] normally quite solicitous where the federal purse [is] involved ....
Id.
244. Id. (Black, J., dissenting). "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judi-
cial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States."
Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting). "The courts... are choked with lawsuits .... The
number of cases . . .have reached an unprecedented volume in recent years." Id. at 428
(Black, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). The sovereign immunity factor will be discussed in
the following section of this Comment. See infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
247. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Carlson involved a suit brought by the administratrix of the estate
of a federal prisoner against the Federal Bureau of Prisons alleging violation of decedent's due
process and equal protection and eighth amendment right against the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 16. The complaint alleged that defendants were fully aware of the
inadequacies of their medical facilities and staff at the Federal Correction Center in Terre
Haute, Indiana, and of the seriousness of decedent's chronic asthmatic condition. Nonethe-
less, they kept him at the facility against the advice of doctors, failed to give him competent
medical attention, administered contraindicated drugs, attempted to use a respirator known to
be inoperative and delayed too long in transferring the prisoner to an outside hospital. The
complaint further alleged that this lack of attention was due in part to racial prejudice. Id. at
16 n.1.
248. Id. at 19. In other words, to effectively perform his duties, should the defendant/
official be protected from liability for constitutional violations he may cause through the scope
of his employment?
249. 586 F. Supp. at 783. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. The court held that
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action for damages against the federal government relying on the ration-
ale in Bivens.250 The district court cited Bivens' special factors counsel-
ling hesitation as the reason for denial.21' The district court in Hohri
relied on Congress' interest in maintaining control over the public fisc as
the special factor counselling hesitation.25 2 This concern could be over-
come by allowing the court to issue its judgment, but leaving Congress to
appropriate the funds necessary to satisfy the judgment. The court
would therefore not be intruding on Congress' control over the public
fisc.
Bivens presents yet another separation of powers argument to deny
relief.2 3 In his dissent in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger stated that the
judiciary should not:
create[] a damage remedy not provided for by the Constitution
and not enacted by Congress. We would more surely preserve
the important values of the doctrine of separation of powers-
and perhaps get a better result-by recommending a solution to
the Congress as the branch of government in which the Consti-
tution has vested the legislative power. Legislation is the busi-
ness of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence
for that task-as we do not.254
Although Chief Justice Burger recognized the need for a remedy against
although the takings claim was a viable constitutional claim, it was barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. at 783, 786.
250. Id. at 782-83. The Ilohri court later relied on the separation of powers argument to
refute plaintiffs' equitable argument that the internees have not been adequately compensated.
Id. at 795-96.
Bills are now before Congress that would implement some or all of [the] recommen-
dations [of the CWRIC]. The careful spadework which plaintiffs have done in the
prosecution of their claims in court should contribute to making their argument to
Congress more persuasive. And it may be that Congress will focus more closely on
these claims once plaintiffs have exhausted their possible judicial remedies.
Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in both the appeal of the
district court decision and the denial of an en banc hearing, did not discuss the Bivens argu-
ment. Hohri, 782 F.2d 227; 793 F.2d 304.
251. Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 783.
252. 1d See also supra note 250.
253. To avoid a separation of powers problem, see supra text following note 252. Congress
might in theory refuse to appropriate the funds, but the decision would belong to Congress.
The Court used a similar theory when it issued orders against President Nixon to deliver
certain subpoenaed tape recordings and documents to the district court in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The Court issued the order even though it was not clear whether
it would be able to enforce its order through its contempt power; a contempt order issued
against a sitting President would usurp Congress' impeachment powers, therefore creating a
separation of powers problem.
254. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional conduct by government officials,2"' he concluded that it
was beyond judicial power to effect such a remedy.25 6 Similarly, the dis-
trict court in Hohri concluded that it is not the judiciary's role to create a
cause of action for damages in the internment cases.257 However, one
role of the courts is to encourage congressional action when Congress
acts slowly or not at all.218 In a case such as the internment, where Con-
gress has failed to provide adequate reparations for over forty years, it is
certainly time for the courts to intervene.
Another special factor is concern for overburdening the judicial sys-
tem.259 This factor was not even considered as an argument against cre-
ating a cause of action for damages against federal officials in Bivens. It
likewise should not be considered as an argument against implying a
cause of action for damages against the federal government in the intern-
ment cases. In the internment cases, it was the federal government that
impinged on individuals' constitutional rights, and no danger exists that
the court will be deluged with similar cases.
In Bivens, Justice Black stated in his dissent that even if the Court
had the power to create a remedy,2"° it should refrain from doing so
because it would increase congestion in the judicial system.261 But to
deny a remedy on this basis is specious; the courts exist for the very
purpose of adjudicating wrongs. A light court docket should not be ac-
corded greater importance than a person's constitutional rights.
The view that the judiciary will be overburdened by implying causes
of action in the Constitution has been criticized. For example, in Davis v.
Passman,262 the Court implied a cause of action from the fifth amend-
255. Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "Without some effective sanction, [constitutional
guarantees against unlawful conduct] ... would constitute little more than rhetoric." Id.
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger suggested a statutory scheme providing for, inter alia, a
waiver of sovereign immunity for illegal acts committed in the performance of an official's
duties, the creation of a cause of action for damages for violation of fourth amendment rights
and the creation of a quasi-judicial tribunal to adjudicate the claims. Id. at 422-23 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice relied on the doctrine of respondeat superior as the basis
for this remedy. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
257. 586 F. Supp. at 783.
258. See infra notes 348-52 and accompanying text.
259. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 429-30. (Black, J., dissenting). "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of
creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of
the States.... [T]he business of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and not to make them."
Id. (Black, J., dissenting). See also id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 428-29 (Black, J., dissenting). See also id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
262. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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ment 263 against Congressman Passman for sex discrimination, despite the
court of appeals' concern that the courts would be deluged with
claims.264 The Davis Court did not "perceive the potential for . . . a
deluge" on the federal courts if a damage remedy was made available.26 5
In answer to the court of appeals' concerns, the Davis Court cited Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Bivens:
"Judicial resources . . . are increasingly scarce these days.
Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door
solely on this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on
the comparative importance of classes of legally protected in-
terests. And current limitations upon the effective functioning
of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be
permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise
sound constitutional principles.
'" 266
Thus, concern for overburdening the judicial system is an insufficient rea-
son for refusing to imply a cause of action for damages in the inteinment
cases.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides yet another argument
against allowing damages from the federal government.267 The Bivens
Court specifically avoided passing on the question of official immunity. 26 8
Additionally, the Hohri district court found that "there being no affirma-
tive action by Congress..., the doctrine of sovereign immunity [stood]
as a bar" to plaintiffs' cause of action for damages.269
However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been criticized. 70
Specifically, in Bivens, Justice Harlan stated in dicta that "at the very
least.., a remedy would be available for the most flagrant and patently
263. Davis, 442 U.S. at 248-49. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
264. See Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 800 (1978), rev'd 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Davis, 442
U.S. at 248.
265. Davis, 442 U.S. at 248.
266. See id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). See also Note, supra note 231, at 654-57. "[To immunize the un-
constitutional acts of the government in order to limit the judiciary's workload is to devalue
the Constitution and the tradition of judicial review." Id. at 656.
267. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the sovereign power cannot be sued,
except by its own consent. Comment, Sovereign Immunity: A Battleground of Competing Con-
siderations, 12 Sw. U.L. Rnv. 457 (1981).
268. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
269. Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 783.
270. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Harlan, J., concurring); id at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissent-




unjustified sorts of ... conduct," despite the immunity defense.27 1 Jus-
tice Harlan indicated that the policy reason behind this was that "it is
important, in a civilized society, that the judicial branch of the Nation's
government stand ready to afford a remedy in these circumstances. '272
Thus, it could effectively be argued that sovereign immunity is an out-
dated doctrine that should no longer be followed if the protections pro-
vided by this nation's Constitution are to be "little more than
rhetoric. 2 73 As stated by Chief Justice Burger in his Bivens dissent, "we
can and should be faulted for clinging to an unworkable and irrational
concept of law."'274
Where the government is found, then, to have acted unconstitution-
ally under the guise of necessity275 and where the justification for its ac-
tions is later proven to have been contrived, equity requires that a cause
of action be implied from the Constitution.276 The internment cases are
an especially cogent example of an instance where a cause of action for
damages for constitutional violations, not specifically provided for in the
Constitution or by federal statute, should be implied despite the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity defense.
271. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Harlan, J., concurring).
272. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 242.
[I]n the absence of a "textually demonstrable constitutional comment of [an] issue to
a coordinate political department," we presume that justiciable constitutional rights
are to be enforced through the courts. And, unless such rights are to become merely
precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights
have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other than the
judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of
the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.
Davis, 442 U.S. at 242 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
273. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Van Alstyne, Governmental
Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 919 (discussing abrogation of common
law sovereign immunity for torts at the state level).
274. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the suppression doctrine,
but equally applicable to the doctrine of sovereign immunity); see also id. (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Ruv. 457, 469 (1897)).
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past.
Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,
469 (1897)).
275. The courts are more likely to defer to another branch's judgment regarding military
necessity during times of war when determining whether constitutional rights have been vio-
lated. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
276. "[T]he government must 'play the game fairly' and cannot be allowed to profit from its
own illegal acts." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the suppres-
sion doctrine, but equally applicable to sovereign immunity (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 227 U.S. 438, 469, 471 (1928) (dissenting opinions))).
April 1988] 1015
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:979
Independent status is the final argument against implying a cause of
action for damages. This argument involves the Court's unwillingness to
imply a cause of action for a constitutional violation if it would "inhibit
... efforts to perform... official duties."27 7 The judiciary could find that
the federal government, unlike an official, enjoys such independent sta-
tus, especially during times of national crisis when the government is
often required to act quickly. If the government could be held liable for
constitutional violations arising from such actions, it might be hindered
from effectively performing its duties. The government, then, would ar-
gue that its need for independent status should protect it from liability.
The government would contend that it should be free to act quickly, es-
pecially during times of national crisis, without concern for liability for
implied constitutional violations. However, the government's independ-
ent status would not be hindered if it is liable only for those constitu-
tional violations in which it acted unreasonably. The government's
actions would be curtailed only to the extent that it would have to con-
sider whether its motives for acting were pure before proceeding. Liabil-
ity, then, would only be imposed where, as- in the internment, the
government deprives an individual of constitutional rights based on im-
pure motives, such as racial prejudice. Therefore, the government's inde-
pendence would not be restricted significantly.
The Bivens Court's special factors should not prevent the judiciary
from implying a cause of action for damages on behalf of the internees
against the federal government. Sovereign immunity is outdated278 and
the argument for preservation of judicial resources is not valid. 279 Fur-
thermore, even if a cause of action is implied, Congress' interest in con-
trolling the federal fisc can be maintained 280 and the government's
independent status not curtailed.281 Also, the separation of powers fac-
tor is not an effective argument where, as here, Congress has failed to
remedy constitutional violations which occurred over forty years ago.282
C. Past and Present Legislative Remedies
1. The American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act
The American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, enacted in 1948,283
277. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980).
278. See supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
283. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1987 (1982).
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was the United States' only official attempt to date to provide compensa-
tion for the internees' property losses.284 Because the Act was poorly
designed, it did not provide sufficient compensation.285  First, the Act
gave the Attorney General jurisdiction to "compromise and settle and
make an award in an amount not to exceed $100,000... when such
claim... for damage to or loss of real or personal property... [was] a
reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation or exclusion of
such person .... ,286 Second, the Act could compensate only for prop-
erty losses that could be proved by records.287 Lastly, once a claim had
been paid under the Act, the claimant waived his right to make any fur-
ther claims arising out of the evacuation against the United States, its
officers, agents, servants and employees. 2s8  Because of these constraints,




Presently two bills concerning reparations for the internment are
before Congress: Senate Bill S. 1009 and House Bill H.R. 442.290 They
284. See 133 CONG. REc. H7579 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. McCandless).
285. See supra note 131 for a discussion of the Act's inadequate compensation.
286. 50 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1982).
287. P. IRONS, supra note 6, at 348; 50 U.S.C. § 1983(b) (1982). Obtaining the necessary
records was "an impossible task for most potential claimants." P. IRONS, supra note 6, at 348.
The Act provided $37 million in compensation from claims filed totaling $148 million. PER-
SONAL JusTicE DENIED, supra note 30, at 118; P. IRONS, supra note 6, at 348. The Federal
Reserve Bank estimated that Japanese Americans lost $400 million in property due to the
internment. P. IRONS, supra note 6, at 348. The Act did not cover loss of earnings and profits
from businesses and farms sold under the hurried conditions prior to evacuation or the loss of
constitutional rights. Id.
288. 50 U.S.C. § 1984(d) (1982).
289. See supra note 287. The Commission estimated that based on 1945 dollars, the intern-
ees lost between $108 and $164 million in income and between $41 and $206 million in prop-
erty. Id. In 1983 dollars, the losses are between $810 million and $2 billion. Id.
290. The House passed H.R. 442 on September 17, 1987 by a vote of 243 to 141. 133
CONG. REc. H7595 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987). Senate Bill 1009 was reported out of the Com-
mittee on Governmental Affairs on October 20, 1987, but has not been debated on the floor. S.
REP. No. 202, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). As of September 1987, S. 1009 had 75 co-spon-
sors out of the 51 votes needed to pass. Cloud, House Votes to Make Amendsfor World War II
Internment, 45 CONG. Q. 2246 (1987); Letter from Grayce Uyehara, Executive Director of the
Japanese American Citizens League Legislative Education Committee (JACL-LEC) to Bar-
bara Tang (Oct. 14, 1986) (discussing reparations legislation) (on file at Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review Office) [hereinafter Uyehara Letter]. On April 20, 1988, after this Comment was
sent to the printer, the Senate passed S. 1009. H.R. 442 and S. 1009 will now go to joint
conference for resolution.
The bills are supported by both the JACL-LEC and the National Coalition for Redress/
Reparations (NCRR). Uyehara Letter, supra; NCRR Banner 1 (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter
NCRR Banner]. The NCRR is a grassroots coalition composed of Japanese Americans and
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essentially parallel each other, and were proposed to accept and imple-
ment the CWRIC's recommendations. 291 The purposes of the bills are to
publicly apologize for the internment, recognize that the internment was
fundamentally unjust and provide monetary redress to those who were
actually interned. z92 The bills also provide for an education fund to in-
form the public about the internment2 93 and to establish a board respon-
sible for making disbursements from the fund.294 The bill would
others. Hearings on S. 2116, supra note 90, at 106 (testimony of NCRR) (Senate Bill 2116,
98th Congress, 2d session, was the 1984 version of Senate Bill 1009). The NCRR's purpose is
to organize and develop community efforts to win reparations for the internees. Id. The
JACL-LEC is part of a Japanese American citizen's league. See Uyehara Letter, supra. One
purpose of the Legislative Education Committee (LEC) is to support passage of H.R. 442 and
S. 1009. See id. Both the JACL-LEC and the NCRR pushed for passage of the bills during
the 100th Congress. Id.; see NCRR Banner at 1-2. The JACL-LEC has stated that it is firmly
"against any amendments that would delete the individual payment." Uyehara Letter, supra;
see infra note 296 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed individual payment.
291. The Senate Bill and House Bills are similar. See Appendix I and II.
The major differences between H.R. 442 and S. 1009 are:
(1) S. 1009 discusses and provides for reparations to the Aleuts who were evacuated
from the Pribilofs and Aleutian chain islands during World War II. S. REP. No. 202, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987);
(2) S. 1009 provides for a $1.3 billion fund, rather than H.R. 442's $1.25 billion fund.
H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(e) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong,, 1st Sess. § 204(b) (1987);
(3) S. 1009 provides that claims would be extinguished against the United States 10
years after the bill becomes law, or when an eligible person receives total payment. S. 1009,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(e) (1987). H.R. 442 provides that payment is in full settlement of
any claim against the United States arising out of the internment. An eligible individual must
affirmatively refuse payment within six months of notice of eligibility or have his claims against
the United States extinguished. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., Ist Sss. § 7(a)(3) (1987).
292. The House bill's stated purpose is to:
(1) acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and in-
ternment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ances-
try during World War II;
(2) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for the evacuation, reloca-
tion, and internment of such citizens and permanent resident aliens;
(3) provide for a public education fund to finance efforts to inform the public about
the internment of such individuals so as to prevent the recurrence of any similar
event;
(4) make restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned;
(5) discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in
the future; and
(6) make more credible and sincere any declaration of concern by the United States
over violations of human rights committed by other nations.
H.R. 442, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1987). See also S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b)
(1987).
293. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b)(3)
(1987).
294. Id. at § 8(a). The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, would appoint
a board consisting of nine members to carry out the bill's purposes. Id. at § 8(c)(1). Senate
Bill 1009 provides that at least five members must be of Japanese ancestry. S. 1009, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(c) (1987). No such provision is found in the House bill. See Appendix
I. No board member could be a governmental officer or employee. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., Ist
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establish a $1.25 billion fund295 out of which a restitution payment of
$20,000 per internee living at date of enactment would be provided, with
the oldest internees receiving compensation first.296
The government would have the burden to use records already in its
possession to locate internees and distribute funds to themii. 297 The At-
torney General would be required to review criminal convictions for vio-
lations under evacuation, relocation and internment laws or military
orders.298 Under the Act, the Attorney General would then request that
the President offer pardons to any individual the Attorney General
Sess. § 8(c)(1) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(c) (1987). The board would termi-
nate not later than 90 days after the $1.25 billion fund, including any income earned on the
fund, was expended or 10 years after the bill's enactment, whichever was earlier. H.R. 442,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6(d), 8(h) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(h) (1987).
295. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(e) (1987). S. 1009 provides for a $1.3 billion fund.
S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(b) (1987). Approximately 60,000 internees are still liv-
ing. RECOMMENDATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1983). An individual may refuse
payment, but such refusal would bar receipt of any future payment under the bill. H.R. 442,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a)(2) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(a)(2) (1987). Any
amount refused would remain in the fund. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a)(2) (1987);
S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(a)(2) (1987). Payment of the $20,000 reparations to an
individual would be in full settlement of all claims against the United States arising out of the
internment. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7(a)(3), 10(2)(B) (1987); see S. 1009, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(e) (1987). The reparations payment would not be included in income
for tax purposes. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(g) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 205(f)(1) (1987). The fund may only be used:
(1) to sponsor research and public educational activities [about the internment], and
to publish the hearings and findings of the Commission, so that the events surround-
ing the evacuation, relocation, and internment of the United States citizens and per-
manent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry will be remembered, and so that the
causes and circumstances of this and similar events may be illuminated and under-
stood; and (2) for reasonable administrative expenses of the Board ....
H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(b) (1987); see also S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(b)
(1987).
296. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7(a)(1), (b) & 10(2) (1987). The Attorney General
must identify and locate eligible individuals within nine months after enactment. Id. at
§ 7(a)(1). If an eligible individual has not received payment or been notified of eligibility by
September 30, 1989, then that person may notify and provide documentation of eligibility to
the Attorney General. Id. at § 7(d).
297. Id. at § 7(a)(1). Costs incurred in carrying out the Attorney General's duties would
not be paid out of the fund. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(e) (1987). Senate Bill 1009
differs from House Bill 442 because the Senate Bill directs the Attorney General to "encourage
each eligible individual to submit his current address to the Department of Justice through a
public awareness campaign." S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(a) (1987). However, the
Attorney General would also be required to locate each eligible individual using records al-
ready in the federal government's possession. Id. But see H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7(c) (1987).
298. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(1)-(3) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 202(a) (1987).
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recommends. 299
a major criticisms of and suggestions for amendments
to the present bills
A problem unique to the Senate Bill is that it does not indicate
whether the remedies provided are to be exclusive of any other potential
remedies the internees may have against the government. This is signifi-
cant because, based on pending litigation,300 the internees may be al-
lowed to pursue a class action suit against the government for
constitutional violations due to the internment.3 0 1 Therefore, it needs to
be clarified whether, under the Senate Bill's provisions, an internee could
accept the $20,000 reparation and still be included as a member of the
Hohri class.30 2 Since the bill provides that once an eligible individual
refuses payment, he has forever waived his entitlement,30 3 an internee
might have to choose between accepting a reparation payment or being a
member of the Hohri class. 3 4
Related to this, Congress should clarify exactly what harms the
$20,000 restitution payment compensates. Although the bills list find-
ings and/or purposes, they do not clearly state what injuries the $20,000
payment redresses.305 The bills merely state that the purpose of the pay-
ment is to "make restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry
who were interned. '30 6 The bills should be re-drafted to make clear
whether the restitution includes payment for property losses, as well as
299. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)-(c) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 202(b)-(c) (1987).
300. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer to the Federal
Circuit).
301. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 256.
302. H.R. 442 § 7(a)(3) provides: "The payment to an eligible individual under this section
shall be in full satisfaction of any claim of such individual against the United States arising out
of acts done to that individual that are described in section 10(2)(B)." H.R. 442, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 7(a)(3) (1987). H.R. 442 § 7(a)(3) also provides that a person who "does not refuse
to accept" payment within six months after receiving notice of eligibility is precluded from
asserting claims arising out of the internment against the United States. Id.
303. S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(a)(2) (1987).
304. According to Hohri, the statute of limitations on the internees' takings claim began to
run in 1980. Hohfi, 782 F.2d at 253. Therefore, if an internee is not included in the Hohri
class, and he did not file an action before 1986, his takings claim would be barred by the
running of the six year statute of limitations.
305. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(b)
(1987).
306. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(4) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b)(4)
(1987).
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for violation of individual rights." 7 This clarification could be important
for determining whether a person has already been compensated for
property losses and therefore possibly excluded from Hohri class mem-
bership. 08 Also, clarification could be important as precedent in favor of
compensation for future governmental violations of an individual's con-
stitutional rights.3 9
Another problem with the bills is that no mechanism ensures that
the Attorney General will be fair in his recommendations to the Presi-
dent for pardons of criminal convictions arising out of the evacuation,
relocation and internment.310 Similarly, no mechanism ensures that fed-
eral departments and agencies will fairly review an internee's application
307. To clarify this, Congress could re-draft the bill to parallel § l(b)(5) of Senate Bill 1009
which lists the reasons behind restitution to the Aleuts.
(b) PURPOSES.-The purposes of this Act are to-
(5) make restitution to Aleut residents... in settlement of United States obliga-
tions in equity and at law, for-
(A) injustices suffered and unreasonable hardships endured while under
United States control during World War II,
(B) personal property taken or destroyed by United States forces during
World War I"
(C) community property, including community church property, taken or
destroyed by United States forces during World War Il- and
(D) traditional village lands on Attu Island not rehabiltated after World
War II for Aleut occupation or other productive use.
S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(b)(5) (1987).
308. If the Supreme Court ultimately determines that the internees may bring a cause of
action against the government only for takings violations, then the district court may narrow
the Hohri class membership to those internees that have not been compensated for property
losses under the Civil Liberties Act of 1987. It is therefore important for the bills to specify
precisely what is being compensated. The legislative history of the House bill indicates that
property losses are not meant to be compensated by the Civil Liberties Act of 1987, but this
should be specified in the legislation itself. "It is important to emphasize that this $20,000
payment per person is not reimbursement for the loss of property or employment. Rather, it is
in the nature of 'liquidated damages'-these individuals are being partially compensated for
the violation of their civil rights." 133 CONG. REC. H7561 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (state-
ment of Rep. Fish). "Under H.R. 442, the restitution is not for lost property and wages...
but for the sweeping loss of individual rights." Id. at H7594 (statement of Rep. Mineta).
Similarly, for clarity, the bills should specify that an internee is entitled to compensation
under the 1987 Act even though he has received compensation under the American-Japanese
Evacuation Claims Act. See S. REP. No. 202, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987).
309. Two purposes enumerated in House Bill 442, but not in Senate Bill 1009, are to:
"(5) discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future;
and (6) make more credible and sincere any declaration of concern by the United States over
violations of human rights committed by other nations." H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(5)-(6) (1987). If these two purposes are to be fulfilled, the bill should clearly state that the
monetary reparation includes compensation for violations of constitutional rights.
310. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1987). A similar provision provides for restitu-
tion of governmental positions, status or entitlements lost as a result of the evacuation, reloca-
tion and internment. Id. § 5. The bill directs United States departments and agencies to
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for restitution of a "position, status, or entitlement lost in whole or in
part because of... the evacuation, relocation, and internment .... '3 11
A possible solution to this problem might be an appeal process to review
the Attorney General's recommendations and departmental/agency deci-
sions. The appeal could be to the courts or to another independent body.
Another possibility would be to set up an independent tribunal to make
recommendations to the Attorney General and federal departments/
agencies. The Attorney General and federal departments/agencies could
be required to defer to these recommendations.
b. other proposals
312
Some less critical proposals include the following:
1. Amend the bills to specify that recovery is for the government's
constitutional violations of the rights of those interned during World
War II.313 This change would recognize the unconstitutionality of the
government's acts in a more meaningful way than the presently proposed
public apology.
2. Adopt the House Bill's provisions expressing two of the Act's
purposes: to "discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and viola-
tions in the future," '314 and to "make more credible and sincere any dec-
laration of concern by the United States over violations of human rights
committed by other nations." '315 This amendment would serve as a re-
minder to future generations of the grave errors that can be made during
times of national crisis.316
liberally review applications made for restitution of positions, status or entitlements. Id. See
also S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202-203 (1987).311. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1987). See also S. 1009, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 203(a) (1987).
312. Another criticism that has been made is that, as with any compensation system, the
flat $20,000 per internee reparation will overcompensate some while undercompensating
others. An example of someone who might be overcompensated is an infant born in the
relocation camps. If this infant suffered no adverse medical or emotional effects from the
internment, then the $20,000 payment would overcompensate him. An example of someone
who might be undercompensated is someone who lost real property as a result of the
internment. In most cases, the $20,000 payment would not compensate for the loss of real
property as well as losses of personal freedom, personal property, constitutional rights,
education and job training. Furthermore, in 1945 dollars, the reparations payment is
equivalent to only $2,863. 133 CONG. REc. H7578 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of
Rep. Swindall).
313. Compare H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1(a)(6) (1987).
314. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(5) (1987).
315. Id. § 2(6).




3. Adopt the Senate Bill's recommendation that eligible individu-
als be encouraged to ifie claims through a public awareness campaign.317
The primary burden to locate eligible individuals should remain on the
government. However, since many eligible individuals are now elderly,
an awareness campaign would help ensure that eligible recipients receive
their reparations in a timely manner. It would also be important to pro-
vide notification of eligibility in both Japanese and English.
4. Include heirs of internees in the definition of "eligible individu-
als."' 318 This would ensure that these heirs would receive that which the
decedent would have left to them but for the losses incurred due to the
internment.
5. Adopt the Senate Bill's longer period for the extinguishment of
claims against the United States. Presently, the Senate Bill provides for a
ten year cut-off of all claims by internees against the United States.3"
The House Bill provides for only a six month cut-off.
320
The adoption of the longer ten year period would be important be-
cause of pending and future litigation. This longer period is necessary to
allow Hohri class members, and others who might want to file suit inde-
pendently, time to decide whether to accept or reject payment.
6. The bills also provide for a board to "sponsor research and pub-
lic educational activities, and to publish the hearings and findings of the
Commission, so that events surrounding the evacuation, relocation, and
internment... will be remembered .... ,,321 To ensure that the funds are
used in the best interests of the Japanese American community, it would
I am appalled by the suggestion made by some Members of the House that one of the
consequences of approval of this bill may be the rebirth of the discrimination against
Japanese-Americans that gave rise to this wrong. To my mind that would be a rea-
son for approving this bill, to show that this Congress believes... that there is no
place for such vicious thinking in our country, that threats or warnings, that such
attitudes will rise again if we pass this act cannot be accepted or endorsed.
133 CONG. REc. H7582 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Yates).
I was around in 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, and 1947, and I heard that word. I
did not like it then, and I do not like it now. The word I am talking about is the
word, "Jap." I hear it in this country too much, and I hear it in conjunction with the
trade bill.
133 CONG. RIc. H7590 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Armey). "The current
discrimination is motivated in part by fears among some Americans that Asians are 'taking
over' businesses and jobs. The inability of certain U.S. industries to compete effectively against
Asian-particularly Japanese-imports has been a factor." 133 CONG. Rnc. H7571 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Levine of California).
317. S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(a)(1) (1987).
318. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(2) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 201(1) (1987).
319. S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(e) (1987).
320. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a)(3) (1987).
321. Id. § 8(b)(1). The Senate bill provides for disbursements from the fund for the "gen-
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be important for some members of the board to be of Japanese
ancestry.322
7. Provide funds for the preservation or reconstruction of at least
one relocation center as a national memorial/museum. If the internment
is to be remembered, surely the place where the internees were held
should be preserved.
Related to this, a provision should be included so that any remain-
ing funds at the board's sunset would be donated to help maintain this
memorial/museum.323
Although these bills do not represent a perfect solution to the
wrongs committed, they are a long overdue step toward compensating
the internees. The next section will discuss how Congress can help deter
similar internment-like actions from occurring in the future.
D. A Legislative Proposal to Prevent Future Denials of Constitutional
Rights by the Federal Government
As discussed, it is necessary for Congress and/or the courts to pro-
vide redress to the internees for wrongs committed against them during
World War II. But what of future violations of constitutional rights
under similar circumstances? To protect against future violations, Con-
gress should enact legislation to provide qualified immunity324 to the fed-
eral government in "internment type' 325 circumstances. Congress could
model legislation after the subjective standard for qualified immunity de-
lineated in Butz v. Economou.326 This would help ensure that the govern-
ment carefully weighs decisions that might be motivated by racial or
eral welfare of the ethnic Japanese community in the United States. ." S. 1009, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(b)(4) (1987).
322. S. 1009, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(c) (1987).
323. Presently, if all funds are not expended 10 years after enactment, the remainder will be
deposited in the miscellaneous receipts account in the Treasury. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 6(d) (1987); S. 1009, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 206(h) (1987). A provision allowing for
remaining funds to be used to maintain a memorial would only be just. After more than 40
years, it is not appropriate to allow funds not expended to be returned to the federal govern-
ment. Had Congress acted earlier, the monies would have been used to compensate internees
that are now deceased.
324. See H.R. 595, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1775, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.
2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (suggesting a remedy against the United States for constitu-
tional torts and disallowing the federal government from asserting absolute or qualified immu-
nity of an employee as a defense). Presently, the federal government has absolute immunity
for violations of almost all constitutional rights. This Comment suggests qualified immunity
for the federal government because of the more realistic possibility of enactment.
325. This proposal is limited to internment type situations in which government officials act
out of prejudice, rather than out of concern for national security.
326. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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other types of prejudice as opposed to a genuine concern for national
security. Moreover, if it was found that the government was not entitled
to absolute immunity, redress would be available to the citizen.
1. Butz v. Economou: The rationale for allowing qualified immunity
In Butz, the Court found that federal officials are not always entitled
to absolute immunity.327 For example, if the executive officer knew or
should have known that he was acting in a way which violated the Con-
stitution or a clearly established constitutional rule, then he was entitled
only to qualified immunity.328 The Court's rationale was that if "all offi-
cials were.., exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitu-
tion could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any
degree deter federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs.
' 3 9
The Court balanced the need to redress the wrong against the need to
protect officials "required to exercise their discretion and the related pub-
lic interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.
'330
The Court then concluded that. qualified immunity would address all
concerns. 331 An official would not be liable for a mistake of judgment,
fact or law,332 and therefore would not be hindered from performing his
duties. Yet, the citizen would be protected when an official knew or
should have known his acts were unconstitutional.333
The rationale for allowing qualified immunity to officials is equally
applicable to the federal government. Qualified immunity would both
redress the wrong and protect the government from liability if the gov-
ernment acted appropriately. 334 As recognized in Butz, "it is not unfair
to hold liable the [federal government if it] knows or should know [it] is
acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly es-
327. Id. at 507. In Butz, plaintiff brought a suit for damages against federal executive
branch officials for violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 480. Plaintiff alleged that De-
partment of Agriculture officials had "instituted an investigation and an administrative pro-
ceeding against him in retaliation for his criticism of that agency." Id.
328. Id. at 507.
329. Id. at 505.
330. Id. at 506.
331. See id. at 506-07. See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682, 703-05 (1949) (suggesting that action in damages be allowed against government where
someone's constitutional rights have been violated, but not allowed if action is for declaratory
or injunctive relief because that would hamper government in carrying out its functions). Hin-
dering the government's functions would "outweigh[] the possible disadvantage to the citizen
in being relegated to the recovery of money damages after the event." Id. at 703-04.
332. Butz, 438 U.S. at 507.
333. Id. at 506-07.
334. See infra notes 344-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appropriate stan-
dard of review when the government asserts an affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
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tablished constitutional limits will not [be an undue interference.]" 335
Only qualified immunity should therefore be accorded the federal gov-
ernment for constitutional violations; to do otherwise would deny the
citizen redress.
a. A return to the subjective standard for qualified immunity
i. The Harlow v. Fitzgerald Court's abandonment of the subjective
standard-should an objective or subjective standard be used
to determine the availability of a qualified
immunity defense?
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
336
qualified immunity was not available if an official knew or reasonably
should have known that his actions were unconstitutional (the objective
standard) or if he intentionally deprived someone of constitutional rights
(the subjective standard).337 However, in Harlow, the Supreme Court
held the subjective standard could not be used to deny government offi-
cials qualified immunity. 3a  The Court reasoned that the subjective stan-
dard was incompatible with the Court's desire to prevent "insubstantial
claims" from proceeding to trial.33 9 The Court found that the issue of an
official's intent rarely could be decided on summary judgment. 34° "Judi-
cial inquiry into subjective motivation... may entail broad-ranging dis-
covery and the deposing of numerous persons .... ,341 Thus, under the
subjective standard, even insubstantial claims could not be dismissed
prior to a trial examining an official's motives. 342 The Harlow Court
therefore preferred the objective standard because it allowed insubstan-
tial claims to be decided on summary judgment. 43
335. Butz, 438 U.S. at 506-07. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978). The internment type situation is analogous to the situation in Monell. In Monell, the
Supreme Court held that local governments are liable for infringement of constitutional rights
when acting pursuant to local policy. Id. at 690. Similarly, the federal government should be
liable for unconstitutional actions taken pursuant to congressional enactment or executive
order.
336. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, plaintiff brought an action for damages
against senior White House aides and former President Richard Nixon for conspiracy to vio-
late his constitutional and statutory rights. The violation was based on plaintiff's alleged un-
lawful discharge from employment in the Department of the Air Force. Id. at 802-05.
337. Id. at 815, 817-18.
338. Id. at 817-18.
339. Id. at 815-16.
340. Id. at 816.
341. Id. at 817.
342. Id. at 816.
343. Id. at 815-18.
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ii. The subjective standard should be employed in any legislation
providing qualified immunity
The objective standard should not be used to determine whether the
government is entitled to qualified immunity. In internment type cases,
the issue is not whether the government knew or should have known its
acts were unconstitutional. For example, in Hirabayashi v. United
States,34 the Supreme Court recognized that, under normal circum-
stances, distinctions based on race were denials of equal protection.345
The government therefore constructively knew its racially based curfew
and exclusion orders deprived individuals of constitutional rights. The
racially based curfew and exclusion orders were upheld, however, on the
grounds of "military necessity. ' ' 34 In internment type situations, then,
the question is not whether the government knew it was acting unconsti-
tutionally, but whether its actions were justified under the circumstances.
If the government's actions were justified by military necessity or na-
tional security, and the government acted in good faith, the government's
qualified immunity -would protect it from liability. But, if the govern-
ment's acts were not required by military necessity or for national secur-
ity, then the government's liability would depend on intent. Qualified
immunity would not be available as a defense if it was shown that the
government had acted in bad faith.347 For the very limited purpose of
internment type cases, an inquiry into subjective intent is mandated. An
objective inquiry into whether the government knew or reasonably could
have known its acts were unconstitutional is moot. Since subjective in-
tent is the only useful standard under these circumstances, Congress
should use that standard when drafting legislation which accords the
government qualified immunity.
V. CONCLUSION
A. The Role of the Supreme Court and Congress
The time has come for the Supreme Court to provide common law
on the matter of the government's sovereign immunity for violations of
the internees' constitutional rights. As Chief Judge Markey stated,
"[t]he wrongs.., done to Americans of Japanese ancestry under Execu-
344. 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
345. Id. at 100.
346. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
347. Of course, the statute of limitations would need to be long enough to allow evidence of
bad faith to be discovered. A court might use an equitable tolling theory to toll the statute of
limitations when the government disguises its bad faith. See supra notes 183-88 and accompa-
nying text.
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tive Order 9066 is disputed by no one involved in [the Hohri v. United
States] case."'348 The Court's role may be to provide a means to involve
Congress in "the continuing process of defining the content and conse-
quences of individual liberties." '49 Thus, where Congress has refused or
failed to act, the Court should provide constitutional common law
which, if considered too far-reaching, Congress could modify or reject.350
Therefore, if the Hohri case comes before the Supreme Court again, the
Court should allow plaintiffs to pursue their causes of action.351 This
would pressure Congress to pass reparations legislation.3 52 The Supreme
Court's decision, then, would serve as an incentive for Congress to act on
a matter that has gone unattended for decades. The Supreme Court's
decision might also serve as an incentive for Congress to enact legislation
providing qualified immunity to the federal government in internment
type situations. Such legislation would allow redress for unconstitutional
actions, yet prevent the government from being held liable if it acts in
good faith.
Some would prefer to forget the internment ever occurred. They
believe it could never happen again. But until racial and other prejudices
are eradicated, it is all too possible that an internment type situation
could once again develop. It is therefore essential that this Country rec-
ognize its mistake in a meaningful way-by providing reparations to
those interned and enacting legislation allowing a cause of action against
the federal government for constitutional violations which might occur in
the future.
Barbara L. Tang*
348. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 256 (D.C. Cir.) (Markey, Chief Judge, dissent-
ing), reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 793 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded,
107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987) (with instructions to transfer case to the Federal Circuit); see President
Ford's repeal of Executive Order 9066 where he stated that Executive Order 9066 was a mis-
take. Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8 (1977); see also Hohri, 782 F.2d at 253 n.67.
349. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REv. 25, 27 (1975).
350. Id. at 29.
351. Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 772-73.
352. As previously discussed, the 100th Congress recently passed reparations legislation.
See supra notes 290-99 and accompanying text. Should the President veto this legislation,
Congress would have to override the President's veto by a two-thirds vote for it to become law.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Christopher N. May of Loyola Law School for
his guidance and insight throughout the preparation of this Comment and Raymond Tang for






To implement recommendations of the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Civil Liberties Act of 1987".
SEC. 2. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are to-
(1) acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relo-
cation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident
aliens of Japanese ancestry during World War II;
(2) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for the
evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent
resident aliens;
(3) provide for a public education fund to finance efforts to inform
the public about the internment of such individuals so as to prevent the
recurrence of any similar event;
(4) make restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who
were interned;
(5) discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of
civil liberties in the future; and
(6) make more credible and sincere any declaration of concern by
the United States over violations of human rights committed by other
nations.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF THE CONGRESS.
The Congress recognizes that, as described by the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, a grave injustice was
done to both citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry
by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World
War II. As the Commission documents, these actions were carried out
without adequate security reasons, and were motivated in part by racial
prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership. The ex-
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cluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered enormous damages, both
material and intangible, and there were incalculable losses in education
and job training, all of which resulted in significant human suffering for
which appropriate compensation has not been made. For these funda-
mental violations of the basic civil liberties and constitutional rights of
these individuals of Japanese ancestry, the Congress apologizes on behalf
of the Nation.
SEC. 4. REMEDIES WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS.
(a) REVIEW OF CoNvICTIoNs.-The Attorney General is re-
quested to review any case in which an individual living on the date of
the enactment of this Act who, while a United States citizen or perma-
nent resident alien of Japanese ancestry, was convicted of a violation of-
(1) Executive Order Numbered 9066, dated February 19,
1942;
(2) the Act entitled "An Act to provide a penalty for viola-
tion of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining
in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones", approved
March 21, 1942 (56 Stat. 173); or
(3) any other Executive order, Presidential proclamation, law
of the United States, directive of the Armed Forces of the United States,
or other action made by or on behalf of the United States or its agents,
representatives, officers, or employees respecting the exclusion, reloca-
tion, or detention of individuals solely on the basis of Japanese ancestry;
on account of the refusal by such individual, during the evacuation, relo-
cation, and internment period, to accept treatment which discriminated
against the individual on the basis of the individual's Japanese ancestry.
(b) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PARDoNS.-Based upon any review
under subsection (a), the Attorney General is requested to recommend to
the President for pardon consideration those convictions which the At-
torney General considers appropriate.
(c) ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT.-In consideration of the state-
ment of the Congress set forth in section 3, the President is requested to
offer pardons to any individuals recommended by the Attorney General
under subsection (b).
SEC. 5. CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION FINDINGS BY
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
(a) REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS BY ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS.-
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Each department and agency of the United States Government shall re-
view with liberality, giving full consideration to the statement of the Con-
gress set forth in section 3, any application by an eligible individual for
the restitution of any position, status, or entitlement lost in whole or in
part because of any discriminatory act of the United States Government
against such individual which was based upon the individual's Japanese
ancestry and which occurred during the evacuation, relocation, and in-
ternment period.
(b) No NEw AuTHoRrrY CREATED.-Subsection (a) does not
create new authority to grant restitution described in that subsection, or
establish new eligibility to apply for such restitution.
SEC. 6. TRUST FUND.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.-There is hereby established in the Treasury
of the United States the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, to be
administered by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.-
(1) INVESTMENT.-The Secretary of the Treasury shall in-
vest such portion of the Fund as is not, in the judgment of the Secretary,
required to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made
only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States. For such pur-
pose, such obligations may be acquired-
(A) on original issue at the issue price; or
(B) by purchase of outstanding obligations at the mar-
ket price.
(2) SALE OF OBLIGATIONS.-Any obligation acquired by the
Fund may be sold by the Secretary of the Treasury at the market price.
(3) CREDITS TO FuND.-The interest on, and the proceeds
from the sale or redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be
credited to and form a part of the Fund.
(C) USES OF THE FuND.-Amounts in the Fund shall be available
only for disbursement by the Attorney General under section 7 and by
the Board under section 8.
(d) TERMiNATION.-The Fund shall terminate not later than the
earlier of the date on which an amount has been expended from the Fund
which is equal to the amount authorized to be appropriated to the Fund
by subsection (e), and any income earned on such amount, or 10 years
after the date of enactment of this Act. If all of the amounts in the Fund
have not been expended by the end of that 10-year period, investments of
amounts in the Fund shall be liquidated and receipts thereof deposited in
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the Fund and all funds remaining in the Fund shall be deposited in the
miscellaneous receipts account in the Treasury.
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Fund $1,250,000,000. Any amounts appropri-
ated pursuant to this section are authorized to remain available until ex-
pended, except that any funds appropriated for payments by the
Attorney General under section 7 shall be used for such payments during
the fiscal year in which the funds are first made available.
SEC. 7. RESTITUTION.
(a) LOCATION AND PAYMENT OF ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Subject to paragraph (4), the Attorney
General shall pay out of the Fund to each eligible individual the sum of
$20,000, unless such individual refuses to accept the payment. The At-
torney General shall, within 9 months after the date of the enactment of
this Act, identify and locate, without requiring any application for pay-
ment and using records already in the possession of the United States
Government, each eligible individual. Failure to be identified and lo-
cated within such 9-month period shall not preclude an eligible individ-
ual from receiving payment under this section. Any eligible individual
may notify the Attorney General that such individual is an eligible indi-
vidual, and may provide documentation therefor. The Attorney General
shall designate an officer or employee to whom such notification and doc-
umentation may be sent. The Attorney General shall, when funds are
made available for payments to an eligible individual under this section,
notify that eligible individual of his or her eligibility for payment under
this section.
(2) EFFECT OF REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PAYMENT.-If an eligi-
ble individual refuses to accept any payment under this section, the
amount of such payment shall remain in the Fund, and no payment may
be made under this section to such individual at any time after such
refusal.
(3) PAYMENT IN FULL SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST
THE UNITED STATES.-The payment to an eligible individual under this
section shall be in full satisfaction of any claim of such individual against
the United States arising out of acts done to that individual that are de-
scribed in section 10(2)(B). This paragraph shall apply to any eligible
individual who does not refuse to accept payment under this section
within 6 months after receiving the notification from the Attorney Gen-
eral referred to in the last sentence of paragraph (1).
(4) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.-No payment
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may be made under this section to any individual who, after September
1, 1987, is awarded a final judgment or a settlement on a claim of such
individual against the United States for acts done to that individual that
are described in section (10)(2)(B).
(b) ORDER OF PAYMENTS.-The Attorney General shall endeavor
to make payments under this section to eligible individuals in the order
of date of birth (with the oldest receiving full payment first), until all
eligible individuals have received payment in full.
(C) RESOURCES FOR LOCATING ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS.-In at-
tempting to locate any eligible individual, the Attorney General may use
any facility or resource of any public or nonprofit organization or any
other record, document, or information that may be made available to
the Attorney General.
(d) NOTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION BY ELIGIBLE INDIVID-
uAL.-Any eligible individual who, by September 30, 1989, has not re-
ceived payment under this section from the Attorney General or has not
otherwise been notified by the Attorney General for purposes of payment
under this section, may notify the Attorney General that such individual
is an eligible individual and may provide documentation therefor. The
Attorney General shall designate an officer or employee to whom such
notification and documentation may be sent.
(e) ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS NOT PAID FROM THE FUND.-No
costs incurred by the Attorney General in carrying out this section shall
be paid from the Fund or set off against, or otherwise deducted from, any
payment under this section to any eligible individual.
(f) TERMINATION OF DUTIES OF ATTORNEY GENERAL.-The
duties of the Attorney General under this section shall cease with the
termination of the Fund.
(g) CLARIFICATION OF TREATMENT OF PAYMENTS UNDER
OTHER LAWS.- Amounts paid to an eligible individual under this sec-
tion-
(1) shall be treated for purposes of the internal revenue laws
of the United States as damages for human suffering; and
(2) shall not be included as income or resources for purposes
of determining eligibility to receive benefits described in section
3803(c)(2)(C) of title 31, United States Code, or the amount of such
benefits.
SEC. 8. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE FUND.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.-There is hereby established the Civil Liber-
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ties Public Education Fund Board of Directors which shall be responsi-
ble for making disbursements from the Fund in the manner provided in
this section.
(b) USES OF FUND.-The Board may make disburserrients from
the Fund only-
(1) to sponsor research and public education activities, and to
publish the hearings and findings of the Commission, so that the events
surrounding the evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States
citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry will be
remembered, and so that the causes and circumstances of this and similar
events may be illuminated and understood; and
(2) for reasonable administrative expenses of the Board, in-
cluding expenses incurred under subsections (c)(3), (d), and (e).
(C) MEMBERSHIP.-
(1) APPOINTMENT.-The Board shall be composed of 9
members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, from individuals who are not officers or employees of the
United States Government.
(2) TERMS.- (A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B)
and (C), members shall be appointed for terms of 3 years.
(B) Of the members first appointed-
(i) 5 shall be appointed for terms of 3 years; and
(ii) 4 shall be appointed for terms of 2 years; as des-
ignated by the President at the time of appointment.
(C) Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring
before the expiration of the term for which such member's predecessor
was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of such term. A
member may serve after the expiration of such member's term until such
member's successor has taken office. No individual may be appointed to
more than 2 consecutive terms.
(3) COMPENSATION.-Members of the Board shall serve
without pay, except that members of the Board shall be entitled to reim-
bursement for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred
by them in carrying out the functions of the Board, in the same manner
as persons employed intermittently in the United States Government are
allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code.
(4) QUORUM.-5 members of the Board shall constitute a
quorum but a lesser number may hold hearings.
(5) CHAIR.-The Chair of the Board shall be elected by the
members of the Board.
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(d) DIRECTOR AND STAFF PERSONNEL.-
(1) DIRECTOR.-The Board shall have a Director who shall
be appointed by the Board.
(2) ADDITIONAL STAFF.-The Board may appoint and fix
the pay of such additional staff as it may require.
(3) APPLICABILITY OF CIVIL SERVICE LAwS.-The Director
and the additional staff of the Board may be appointed without regard to
section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, and without regard to the
provisions of such title governing appointments in the competitive ser-
vice, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and
subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and
General Schedule pay rates, except that the compensation of any em-
ployee of the Board may not exceed a rate equivalent to the minimum
rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule under sec-
tion 5332(a) of such title.
(e) ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES.-The Administrator of
General Services is authorized to provide to the Board on a reimbursable
basis such administrative support services as the Board may reasonably
request.
(f) GIFrs AND DONATiON.-The Board may accept, use, and
dispose of gifts or donations of services or property for purposes author-
ized under subsection (b).
(g) ANNUAL REPORTS.-Not later than 12 months after the first
meeting of the Board and every 12 months thereafter, the Board shall
transmit to the President and to each House of the Congress a report
describing the activities of the Board.
(h) TERMINATION.-90 days after the termination of the Fund,
the Board shall terminate and all obligations of the Board under this
section shall cease.
SEC. 9. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE INTERNMENT.
(a) DEPOSIT OF DOCUMENTS IN NATIONAL ARCHIVEs.-All doc-
uments, personal testimony, and other material collected by the Commis-
sion during its inquiry shall be delivered by the custodian of such
material to the Archivist of the United States who shall deposit such
material in the National Archives of the United States. The Archivist
shall make such material available to the public for research purposes.
(b)(1) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN RECORDS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.-The Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives is authorized to permit the Archivist of the United States to make
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available for use records of the House not classified for national security
purposes, which have been in existence for not less than thirty years,
relating to the evacuation, relocation, and internment of individuals dur-
ing the evacuation, relocation, and internment period.
(2) This subsection is enacted as an exercise of the rulemak-
ing power of the House of Representatives, but is applicable only with
respect to the availability of records to which it applies, and supersedes
other rules only to the extent that the time limitation established by this
section with respect to such records is specifically inconsistent with such
rules, and is enacted with full recognition of the constitutional right of
the House to change its rules at any time, in the same manner and to the
same extent as in the case of any other rule of the House.
SEC. 10. DEFINITIONS.
For the purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "evacuation, relocation, and internment period"
means that period beginning on December 7, 1941, and ending on June
30, 1946;
(2) the term "eligible individual" means any individual of Japanese
ancestry who is living on the date of the enactment of this Act and who,
during the evacuation, relocation, and internment period-
(A) was a United States citizen or a permanent resident alien;
and
(B) was confined, held in custody, relocated, or otherwise de-
prived of liberty or property as a result of-
(i) Executive Order Numbered 9066, dated February
19, 1942;
(ii) the Act entitled "An Act to provide a penalty for
violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, re-
maining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones",
approved March 21, 1942 (56 Stat. 173); or
(iii) any other Executive order, Presidential proclama-
tion, law of the United States, directive of the Armed Forces of the
United States or other action made by or on behalf of the United States
or its agents, representatives, officers, or employees respecting the exclu-
sion, relocation, or detention of individuals solely on the basis of Japa-
nese ancestry; except that the term "eligible individual" does not include
any individual who, during the period beginning on December 7, 1941,
and ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a country while the
United States was at war with that country;
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(3) the term "permanent resident alien" means an alien lawfully
admitted into the United States for permanent residence;
(4) the term "Fund" means the Civil Liberties Public Education
Fund established in section 6;
(5) the term "Board" means the Civil Liberties Public Education
Fund Board of Directors established in section 8; and
(6) the term "Commission" means the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians, established by the Commission
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act.
SEC. 11. COMPLIANCE WITH BUDGET ACT.
No authority under this Act to enter into contracts or to make pay-
ments shall be effective except to the extent or in such amounts as are
provided in advance in appropriations Acts. Any provision of this Act
which, directly or indirectly, authorizes the enactment of new budget au-
thority shall be effective only for fiscal year 1989 and thereafter.
Passed the House of Representatives September 17, 1987.
Attest: DONALD K. ANDERSON,
Clerk
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TO ACCEPT THE FINDINGS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON
WARTIME RELOCATION AND
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress Assembled,
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
SECTIoN 1. (a) FINDINaGs-The Congress finds that-
(1) the findings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians, established by the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, accurately and completely de-
scribe the circumstances of the exclusion, relocation, and internment of in
excess of one hundred and ten thousand United States citizens and perma-
nent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry... ;
(2) the internment of individuals of Japanese ancestry was car-
ried out without any documented acts of espionage or sabotage, or other
acts of disloyalty by any citizens or permanent resident aliens of Japanese
ancestry on the west coast;
(3) there was no military or security reason for the internment;
(4) the internment of the individuals of Japanese ancestry was
caused by racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political
leadership;
(5) the excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered
enormous damages and losses, both material and intangible, and there
were incalculable losses in education and job training, all of which resulted
in significant human suffering;
(6) the basic civil liberties and constitutional rights of those in-
dividuals of Japanese ancestry interned were fundamentally violated by
that evacuation and internment;
(b) PURPoSE&s-The purposes of this Act are to-
(1) acknowledge the fundamental injustice of the evacuation,
relocation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resi-
dent aliens of Japanese ancestry;
(2) apologize on behalf of the people of the United States for
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the evacuation, relocation, and internment of the citizens and permanent
resident aliens of Japanese ancestry;
(3) provide for a public education fund to finance efforts to
inform the public about the internment of such individuals so as to prevent
the reoccurrence of any similar event;
(4) make restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry
who were interned;
TITLE I-RECOGNITION OF INJUSTICE AND APOLOGY ON
BEHALF OF THE NATION
SEc 101. The Congress accepts the findings of the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians and recognizes that a
grave injustice was done to both citizens and resident aliens of Japanese
ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during
World War I1 On behalf of the Nation, the Congress apologizes.
TITLE I- UNITED STATES CITIZENS OF JAPANESE
ANCESTRY AND RESIDENT JAPANESE ALIENS
DEFINITIONS
SEc. 201. For the purposes of this title-
(1) the term "eligible individual" means any living individual
of Japanese ancestry who-
(A) is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien
on the date of enactment of this Act; and
(B)(i) was enrolled on the records of the United States
Government during the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and end-
ing on June 30, 1946, as being in a prohibited military zone; or
(ii) was confined, held in custody, or otherwise deprived
of liberty or property during the period as a result of-
(I) Executive Order Numbered 9066 (February 19,
1942; 7 Fed. Reg. 1407);
(II) the Act entitled "'An Act to provide a penalty
for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, re-
maining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones" and
approved March 21, 1942 (56 Stat. 173); or
(III) any other Executive order, Presidential proc-
lamation, law of the United States, directive of the Armed Forces of the
United States, or other action made by or on behalf of the United States or
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its agents, representatives, officers, or employees respecting the exclusion,
relocation, or detention of individuals on the basis of race;
(2) the term "Fund" means the Civil Liberties Public Educa-
tion Fund established in section 204;
(3) the term "Board" means the Civil Liberties Public Educa-
tion Fund Board of Directors established in section 206;
(4) the term "evacuation, relocation, and internment period"
means that period beginning on December 7, 1941, and ending on June
30, 1946; and
(5) the term "Commission" means the Commission on War-
time Relocation and Internment of Civilians, established by the Commis-
sion on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act.
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
SEa 202. (a) REVIEW.-The Attorney General is requested to review
any case in which a United States citizen or permanent resident alien of
Japanese ancestry living on the date of the enactment of this Act was con-
victed of a violation of the laws of the United States, including convictions
for violations of military orders, where such a conviction resulted from
charges filed against such individuals during the evacuation, relocation,
and internment period.
(b) RECOMMENDATIONs-Based upon the review required by sub-
section (a), the Attorney General is requested to recommend to the Presi-
dent forpardon consideration those convictions which the Attorney General
finds were based on a refusal by such individuals to accept treatment that
discriminated against them on the basis of race or ethnicity.
(c) PARDON-In consideration of the findings contained in this
Act, the President is requested to offer pardons to those individuals recom-
mended by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b).
CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION FINDINGS
SEa 203. (a) FEDERAL CONSIDERATIONAND REVIEW.-Departments
and agencies of the United States Government to which eligible individuals
may apply for the restitution of positions, status, or entitlements lost in
whole or in part because of discriminatory acts of the United States Gov-
ernment against such individuals based upon their race or ethnicity and
which occurred during the evacuation, relocation, and internment period
shall review such applications for restitution of positions, status, or entitle-
ments with liberality, giving full consideration to the historical findings of
the Commission and the findings contained in this Act.
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(b) No NEW AUTHORITY CREATED.-Subsection (a) shall not be
construed to create new authority to grant restitution described in that sub-
section, or establish new eligibility to apply for such restitution.
TRUST FUND
SEC 204. (a) ESTABLISHMENT-There is hereby established in the
Treasury of the United States the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund,
to be administered by the Secretary of the Treasury. Amounts in the Fund
shall be invested in accordance with section 9702 of title 3L United States
Code, and shall only be available for disbursement by the Attorney Gen-
eral under section 205, and by the Board of Directors of the Fund under
section 206.
(b) AUTHORIZATION.-There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Fund $500,000,000 in fiscal 1989, $400,000,000 in fiscal 1990,
$200,000,000 in fiscal 1991, $100,000,000 in fiscal 1992 and $100,000,000
in fiscal 1993.
RESTITUTION
SEc 205. (a) LOCATION AND PA YMENT OF ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUAL&-
(1) The Attorney General, with the assistance of the Board,
shall locate, using records already in the possession of the United States
Government, each eligible individual and shall pay out of the Fund to each
such individual the sum of $20,000. The Attorney General shall en-
courage each eligible individual to submit his or her current address to the
Department of Justice through a public awareness campaign.
(2) If an eligible individual refuses to accept any payment
under this section, such amount shall remain in the Fund and no payment
shall be made under this section to such individual at any future date.
(b) PREFERENCE TO OLDEST-The Attorney General shall en-
deavor to make payment to eligible individuals who are living in the order
of date of birth (with the oldest receiving full payment first), until all eligi-
ble individuals who are living have received payment in full.
(c) NONRESiDENTS -In attempting to locate any eligible individual
who resides outside the United States, the Attorney General may use any
available facility or resources of any public or nonprofit organization.
(d) No SET OFF FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CoSTm-No costs incurred
by the Attorney General in carrying out this section shall be paid from the
Fund or set off against, or otherwise deducted from, any payment under
this section to any eligible individual.
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(e) EXTINGUISHMENT OF CLAIMs.-The claims of an eligible indi-
vidual against the United States shall be extinguished-
(A) on a date which is ten years after the date of enact-
ment of this Act; or
(B) on the date by which the individual has received the
total amount of payments under this Act, whichever date first occurs.
(f) CLARIFICATION OF TREATMENT OF PAYMENTS UNDER OTHER
LA w&-Amounts paid to an eligible individual under this section-
(1) shall be treated for purposes of the Internal Revenue laws
of the United States as damages for human suffering; and
(2) shall not be included as income or resources for purposes of
determining eligibility to receive benefits described in section 3803(c)(2)(C)
of title 31, United States Code, or the amount of such benefits.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
SEC 206. (a) ESTABLISHMENT-There is hereby established the Civil
Liberties Public Education Fund Board of Directors which shall be respon-
sible for making disbursements from the Fund in the manner provided in
this section.
(b) DISBURSEMENTS FROM FuND&-The Board of Directors may
make disbursements from the Fund only-
(1) to sponsor research and public educational activities so that
the events surrounding the relocation and internment of United States citi-
zens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry will be
remembered, and so that the cases and circumstances of this and similar
events may be illuminated and understood;
(2) to fund comparative studies of similar civil liberties abuses,
or to fund comparative studies of the effect upon particular groups of racial
prejudice embodied by Government action in times of national stress;
(3) to prepare and distribute the hearings and findings of the
Commission to textbook publishers, educators, and libraries;
(4) for the general welfare of the ethnic Japanese community
in the United States, taking into consideration the effect of the exclusion
and detention on the descendants of those individuals who were detained
during the evacuation, relocation, and internment period (individual pay-
ments in compensation for loss or damages shall not be made under this
paragraph); and
(5) for reasonable administrative expenses, including expenses
incurred under subsections (c)(3), (d), and (e).
(c) MEMBERSHIP AND TERMS OF OFFIcE-(1) The Board shall be
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composed of nine members appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, from persons who are not officers or
employees of the United States Government. At least five of the individuals
appointed shall be individuals who are of Japanese ancestry.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C),
members shall be appointed for terms of 3 years.
(B) Of the members first appointed-
(i) five shall be appointed for terms of 3 years; and
(ii) four shall be appointed for terms of 2 years; as
designated by the President at the time of appointment.
(C) Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring
before the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed
shall be appointed only for the remainder of such term. A member may
serve after the expiration of his term until his successor has taken office.
No individual may be appointed to more than two consecutive terms.
(3) Members of the Board shall serve without pay, except
members of the Board shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel, subsis-
tence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in carrying out the
functions of the Board, in the same manner as persons employed intermit-
tently in the United States Government are allowed expenses under section
5703 of title 5, United States Code.
(4) Five members of the Board shall constitute a quorum but a
lesser number may hold hearings.
(5) The Chair of the Board shall be elected by the members of
the Board.
(d)(1) The Board shall have a Director who shall be appointed by
the Board and who shall be paid at a rate not to exceed the minimum rate
of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section
5332(a) of title 5, United States Code.
(2) The Board may appoint and fix the pay of such additional
staff personnel as it may require.
(3) The Director and the additional staff personnel of the
Board may be appointed without regard to section 5311(B) of title 5,
United States Code, and may be appointed without regard to the provisions
of such title governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be
paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter II of
chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay
rates, except that the compensation of any employee of the Board may not
exceed a rate equivalent to the rate payable under GS-18 of the General
Schedule under section 5332(a) of such title.
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(e) SUPPORT SERVICE.-The Administrator of General Services
shall provide to the Board of Directors on a reimbursable basis such ad-
ministrative support services as the Board may request.
(f) DONATIONS-The Board may accept, use, and dispose of gifts
or donations or services or property for purposes authorized under subsec-
tion (b).
(g) ANNUAL REPORT.-Not later than twelve months after the first
meeting of the Board and every twelve months thereafter, the Board shall
transmit a report describing the activities of the Board to the President and
to each House of the Congress.
(h) SUNSET FOR BoARD.-The Board shall terminate not later than
the earlier of ninety days after the date on which an amount has been
obligated to be expended from the Fund which is equal to the amount
authorized to be appropriated to the Fund or ten years after the date of
enactment of this title. Investments shall be liquidated and receipts
thereof deposited in the Fund and all funds remaining in the Fund shall be
deposited in the miscellaneous receipts account in the Treasury of the
United States.
COMPLIANCE WITH BUDGET ACT
SEa 207. No authority under this title to enter into contracts or to
make payments shall be effective except to the extent or in such amounts
as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts. Any provision of this
title which, directly or indirectly, authorizes the enactment of new budget
authority shall be effective only for fiscal year 1989 and thereafter.
1044
